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Abstract 
In recent years, more stringent aviation regulations have demanded commercial air operators 
to put more emphasis on quantitative risk analysis methods as part of their safety management 
systems. The objective has been to promote aviation safety by identifying the risk factors 
applicable to the operations and mitigating their effectivity based on the risk analysis results. 
In particularly, the importance of proper flight preparation has been underlined by European 
Aviation Safety Agency for the commercial operation of single-engined turbine aeroplanes in 
instrumental weather conditions and at night. Yet, there are still not many comprehensive 
analysis methods, which would examine a flight as an entirety. 
The aim of this thesis was to make a research about different risk analysis methods and find 
suitable means to develop new kind of risk models for the case examples, which were 
aerodrome and landing site determination and flight planning. Under particular interest were 
the questions of how much risk can vary between aeroplane types and in which extent is the 
overall risk mitigatable. The risk models are also supposed to be a basis for a risk tool that 
operators could utilise in their actual flight planning processes in the future. This risk tool 
would primarily be applicable to the operators of single-engined turbine aeroplanes but it is 
utilisable for other performance class B aeroplanes as well. 
As an outcome, a novel weighted fuzzy hierarchy method was developed based on previous 
research. It calculates an individual risk level for each aerodrome and landing site along the 
route and an overall risk level for the entire planned flight. As a base, it uses risk models, 
which are hierarchical structures of each case example’s applicable risk factors. An individual 
weight and set of membership functions were established for each risk factor in order to 
receive rational results. The weights and the membership functions were defined using the 
combination of expert judgement and statistics. Various example calculations showed that 
there are distinct variations in the risk levels of different kinds of operations. From the risk 
mitigation perspective, it was also noticed that the flight crew related risk factors have the 
most significant effect to the risk level. The method proved to be a usable and convenient tool 
to assess risk objectively and therefore further development and validation of this risk 
analysis method is recommended. 
Keywords flight planning, risk, risk factor, hierarchy, fuzzy logic, SET-IMC 
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Tiivistelmä 
Yhä tiukemmat ilmailuvaatimukset ovat viime vuosina vaatineet kaupallisia lento-
operaattoreja panostamaan enemmän määrällisiin riskianalyysimenetelmiin osana heidän 
turvallisuudenhallintajärjestelmiään. Tarkoituksena on ollut ilmailun turvallisuuden 
parantaminen tunnistamalla operaatioihin liittyvät riskitekijät ja pienentämällä niiden 
vaikutusta riskianalyysin tuloksien perusteella. Euroopan ilmailuturvallisuusvirasto on 
painottanut riittävän lennonvalmistelun tärkeyttä erityisesti yksimoottoristen 
potkuriturbiinilentokoneiden kaupallisessa operoinnissa mittarilentokelillä ja yöaikaan. Silti ei 
ole olemassa montaa riskianalyysimenetelmää, joka ottaisi huomioon lentoa kokonaisuutena. 
Tämän diplomityön tavoitteena on tutkia erilaisia riskianalyysimenetelmiä ja löytää sopivat 
keinot kehittämään uudenlaiset riskimallit esimerkkitapauksille, jotka ovat lentokentän ja 
varalaskupaikan määrittäminen ja lennonsuunnittelu. Erityisenä mielenkiinnonkohteena ovat 
kysymykset, kuinka paljon riski voi vaihdella riippuen lentokonetyypistä ja missä määrin 
kokonaisriski on pienennettävissä. Riskimallien on tarkoitus myös toimia perustana 
riskityökalulle, jota operaattorit voisivat tulevaisuudessa käyttää todellisissa 
lennonsuunnitteluprosesseissaan. Tämä riskityökalu olisi pääasiassa tarkoitettu 
yksimoottoristen potkuriturbiinilentokoneiden operaattoreille, mutta se on sovellettavissa 
myös muihin suoritusarvoluokkaan B kuuluviin lentokoneisiin. 
Aiemman tutkimuksen pohjalta kehitettiin uudenlainen, sumeaa logiikkaa ja painokertoimia 
hyödyntävä hierarkkinen menetelmä. Se laskee yksilöllisen riskitason reitin varrella oleville 
kullekin lentokentälle ja varalaskupaikalle ja kokonaisriskitason koko lennolle. Pohjana se 
käyttää riskimalleja, jotka ovat hierarkkisia rakenteita esimerkkitapausten riskitekijöistä. 
Yksilöllinen painokerroin ja sarja jäsenfunktioita määritettiin kullekin riskitekijälle, jotta 
saataisiin rationaalisia tuloksia. Painokertoimet ja jäsenfunktiot määriteltiin sekä asiantuntija-
arvioiden että tilastojen avulla. Useat esimerkkilaskelmat osoittivat, että erilaisilla 
operaatioilla on selviä eroja riskitasoissa. Riskin pienentämisen näkökulmasta huomattiin 
myös, että lentomiehistöön liittyvillä riskitekijöillä on kaikkien suurin vaikutus riskitasoon. 
Menetelmä osoittautui käyttökelpoiseksi ja sopivaksi menetelmäksi riskin arvioimiseen 
objektiivisesti ja tämän johdosta tämän riskianalyysimenetelmän jatkokehittämistä ja 
validointia suositellaan. 
Avainsanat lennonsuunnittelu, riski, riskitekijä, hierarkia, sumea logiikka, SET-IMC 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Theoretical Background 
A quantitative risk analysis methods utilising probability risk assessment (PRA) have become 
increasingly more common in the aviation sector as a part of safety management systems 
(SMS) [1]. More stringent aviation regulations aim to promote safety-based culture among 
aircraft operators. New systems and concepts have to go through a profound analysis before 
they can be adopted as part of daily aircraft operations [2]. 
However, a level of uncertainty has always been a concern in the analyses. An accident is 
always a result of several different factors and quantifying a risk for that is rarely 
straightforward. One has to be able to take in to account all the root causes and weight their 
individual consequences accordingly. The estimation of likelihood for each factor to happen is 
often a combination of mathematics and experts’ judgement. 
Many tools for assessing risk have been developed. These include e.g. decision/fault tree 
analysis, sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo simulation. The methods can be further divided 
to qualitative and quantitative phases. [3] For example, European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) has previously used the fault tree analysis in its rulemaking processes [4]. 
Particularly demanding are the cases having little operational statistical data. Generating 
rational quantitative data for objective decision making is challenging because intuitive 
judgement is always a subjective matter. Using a fuzzy rule-based analysis method, many 
issues of traditional qualitative and quantitative methods can be resolved. It enables safety 
analysts to combine imprecise, ambiguous, qualitative information with quantitative data in a 
consistent manner. [5] As a result, the method can output justified numerical risk levels for 
different risk factors emerged during a flight operation. 
1.2 Objectives and Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis has a target of answering to the following research questions: 
1. How much does the exposed risk vary between aeroplane types? 
2. How much can the risk be mitigated by careful flight planning? 
3. What is the effect of cruise altitude to the overall exposed risk during a flight? 
4. What is the practicality of a fixed risk period applied to single-engined aeroplanes? 
5. What are the risk factors when determining an emergency landing site and how these 
risks can be validated? 
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The goal of the thesis is to make a broad research about the available risk analysis methods 
and analyse their applicability to the case examples defined by the research questions. The 
plan is to choose one or two most suitable methods and use them to create risk models for 
group of performance class B aeroplanes. The examined analysis methods are e.g. Monte 
Carlo simulation and Fuzzy rule-based analysis. 
The current analysis methods used in aviation industry are identified and the goal is to find 
and, if necessary, further develop new practical methods, which could help the task of risk 
assessments in this field. Some tools to validate the risk assessment results are also attempted 
to be found. 
The case examples used in this risk study are aerodrome and landing site determination and 
flight planning. These are a vital part of a flight preparation and also safety management as an 
aeroplane has to have a suitable place to land if engine malfunction(s) occur during a flight. 
Earlier, some studies have suggested that a maximum of 15 minutes risk period should be used 
with single-engined turbine aeroplanes [6]; i.e. an emergency landing site is allowed to be out 
of reach only a maximum of 15 minutes of a flight. The applicability of this recommendation 
will be evaluated for these aeroplanes in this thesis. Furthermore, an appropriate landing site is 
a vital risk mitigation measure and thus its proper determination using risk models will also be 
evaluated in the thesis. 
The input data used in the risk models consists of applicable incident data and aviation experts’ 
experience. The incident data will be gathered from publicly available aviation safety studies 
as seen appropriate and aviation experts will be consulted mainly in civil aviation authority of 
Finland (CAA Finland) as well as in some other companies. The consultation is conducted by 
surveys to get a broader insight of applicable risks and their relative importance. 
1.3 Limitations 
As earlier mentioned, the study will focus on the risks associated with the operation of 
performance class B aeroplanes. A performance class B aeroplane is defined as an aeroplane 
powered by propeller engines with a maximum operational passenger seating configuration of 
nine or less and a maximum take-off mass of 5 700 kg or less [7]. The considered aeroplane 
models are e.g. Piper PA-31 Navajo, Pilatus PC-12 and Beechcraft King Air 100. 
The amount of risk analysis methods introduced in the literature review will be limited to 5-10 
methods and their selection will be based on author’s discretion. 1-2 most appropriate methods 
will further be used in the experimental part. The suitability of a method is evaluated by its 
novelty, accuracy and needed workload. A set of computer simulation software, e.g. 
MATLAB
®
, will be used to the extent possible. 
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2 Commercial Operation of Performance Class B 
Aeroplanes 
2.1 Current Regulation Status in Different Continents 
In this section, air operations laws are studied in the context of operating specialities and 
limitations of performance class B aeroplanes. These specialities and limitations are further 
limited to subjects, which are relevant to the case examples in this thesis. The study has been 
divided for two-engined and single-engined aeroplanes. The considered air operations laws are 
EASA, FAA and CASA regulations. Other regulation structures are excluded in this study. 
2.1.1 Two-engined Aeroplanes 
Europe 
According to EASA Air Operations regulations [7], performance class B aeroplanes shall not 
be operated over a route that contains a point further from an adequate aerodrome, under 
standard conditions in still air, than the distance flown in 120 minutes at the one engine 
inoperative (OEI) cruise speed or 300 NM, whichever is less (CAT.OP.MPA.140). When 
comparing to performance class A aeroplanes, the 120 minutes time limitation can be 
extended up to 180 minutes for small jet aeroplanes (maximum operational passenger seating 
configuration (MOPSC) ≤ 19 or maximum take-off weight (MTOW) < 45 360 kg) with a 
separate authority approval. However, for large jet aeroplanes (MOPSC ≥ 20 or MTOW ≥ 45 
360 kg), the time is limited to 60 minutes but this can also be extended with an extended-range 
twin-engine operational performance standards (ETOPS) approval. 
If OEI situation occurs during en-route flight, the aeroplane shall be capable of continuing 
flight at or above the relevant minimum altitudes for safe flight to a point of 1 000 ft above an 
aerodrome at which the performance requirements can be met (CAT.POL.A.315). In 
comparison, for performance class A aeroplanes the limit is 1 500 ft with a positive flight path 
gradient (CAT.POL.A.215). 
In landing situation, for destination and alternate aerodromes, the landing mass shall allow a 
full stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold within 70 % of the landing distance available 
(LDA) in the case of dry runway (CAT.POL.A.330). In the case of wet runways, the LDA 
shall be equal to or exceed the required landing distance multiplied by a factor of 1.15. Grass 
runways should be handled with this same factor. For contaminated runways, the factor is 1.0 
(CAT.POL.A.335). In contrast, for performance class A jet aeroplane, the numbers are 60 %, 
1.15 and 1.15 respectively (CAT.POL.A.230/235). 
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United States 
Unlike EASA, which categorises aeroplanes as either performance class A, B or C based on 
the engine type, seating configuration and maximum allowable take-off weight, Federal 
Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) parts 121/135 [8] divide 
performance requirements based on the type of commercial operation that is being conducted 
(121 for scheduled and 135 for commuter and on-demand operations) and aircraft’s engine 
type (reciprocating or turbine). Thus FAR is more stringent because both the part 121 and 135 
performance rules apply to all aircrafts, regardless of size or seating configuration. 
To make a basic comparison between EASA’s regulations for performance class B aeroplanes 
and FAA’s equivalent regulations, an assumption must be made that performance class B 
aeroplanes are used for commuter operations and thus part 135 regulations must be complied. 
According to § 135.364, commuter aeroplanes (to include both jet and turboprop aeroplanes) 
are allowed to perform a flight, in which the aeroplane will be a maximum of 180 minutes 
flight time from an adequate airport using OEI speed outside the continental United States. 
This is one hour more than the value EASA is allowing for performance class B aeroplanes. 
The paragraph § 135.398 includes the performance limitations of commuter category 
aeroplanes. It states that the commuter category aeroplanes must comply the same landing 
limitations as turbine-engine-powered large transport category aeroplanes listed in § 135.385 
and § 135.387. These requirements are similar to limitations of performance class A 
aeroplanes in EASA’s regulation structure. 
Australia 
Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) categorises aeroplanes based on their 
maximum take-off weight and the type of operation (e.g. private, aerial work, charter and 
regular public transport operations). The regulations are established in Civil Aviation 
Regulations (CARs), Civil Aviation Orders (CAOs) and Civil Aviation Advisory Publications 
(CAAPs). 
Regarding the threshold time, CAAP 82-1(1) [9] gives information that a maximum of 60 
minutes flight time from an adequate airport using OEI speed is allowed for aeroplanes with 
two turbine engines (turboprop or jet engine). It can be extended with a special extended 
diversion time operations (EDTO) approval or having more than two engines. The maximum 
achievable threshold time is 180 minutes. 
CAO Section 20.7.2 [10] gives further performance limitations for multi-engined aeroplanes 
having a maximum take-off weight not in excess of 5 700 kg. Section 5.3 states that in OEI 
situation the aeroplane shall be capable of returning to the nearest aerodrome with 2 000 ft 
vertical clearance from all terrain and obstructions. This regulation and the above mentioned 
60 minute threshold time are two times stricter than the relevant values in EASA structure. 
 5 
On the other hand, the landing limitations in Section 6 [10] seem to be slightly looser as the 
landing distance available on the runway of intended landing shall be equal to, or greater than, 
the landing distance required for the aeroplane concerned without any extra margins. This 
regulation is also allowed to be neglected in an emergency situation. 
2.1.2 Single-engined Aeroplanes 
Europe 
So far, EASA’s regulations have permitted single-engined turbine and piston aeroplanes to 
operate commercially only in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) due to excessive risk 
related to the operation in instrumental weather conditions and at night (SET-IMC) [7]. 
However, a new rulemaking task RMT.0232-0233 has been in process and in late 2015, an 
Opinion 06/2015 [4] was published to propose the allowance for commercial operation of 
single-engined turbine aeroplanes also in instrumental weather conditions and at night. Until 
now, some operators may have been able to conduct such operations under the conditions set 
out in the existing exemptions granted by Member States [7]. 
In VMC operations, single-engined aeroplanes have to follow same regulations as established 
for performance class B aeroplanes. Yet, as stated in CAT.OP.MPA.136 and CAT.POL.A.320, 
the aeroplane shall only be operated along routes, or within areas, where surfaces are available 
that permit a safe forced landing to be executed in the event of engine failure. Similarly to 
twin-engined aeroplanes, following an engine failure, an aeroplane should be capable of 
reaching a point (1 000 ft above the intended landing area if not otherwise specified), from 
which a safe forced landing can be made. 
The distinction between twin-engined and single-engined aeroplanes is that for twin-engined 
aeroplanes alternate aerodromes must have been predetermined along the route and the 
aeroplane must stay within 120 minutes flying time from those using the OEI speed. Single-
engined aeroplanes on the other hand must always have a landing site within a gliding distance 
and this landing site does not necessary have to be an aerodrome as it can also be a plain field 
suitable for emergency landing. 
Opinion 06/2015 [4] would introduce a new SET-IMC special approval for operators to be 
applied from the competent authority. If it was published as it is now proposed, this new 
approval would allow a fixed 15 minutes risk period to be utilised per flight. This means that 
the aeroplane is allowed to be a maximum of 15 minutes per flight out of reach a suitable 
emergency landing site. Alternatively, the operator could make a separate risk assessment for 
each route and ensure that the total risk level remains under the target fatal accident rate of 
1.3∙10-6 per flight hour. 
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The suggested 15 minutes risk period limitation for single-engined turbine aeroplanes and 120 
minutes flight time from adequate aerodrome limitation for twin-engined aeroplanes are not 
directly comparable because they have a different meaning as Figure 1 illustrates. The 
comparable value for single-engined turbine aeroplane is the time used to glide from cruise 
altitude to 1 000 ft above the intended landing area with the best gliding ratio and speed after 
the engine failure. This is dependent of aeroplane model and for example for Pilatus PC-12 it 
is about 34 minutes with a cruise altitude of 26 000 ft, a glide ratio of 16:1 and a gliding speed 
of 116 KIAS [11]. In other words, Pilatus PC-12 cannot be operated further from the nearest 
adequate aerodrome than the distance flown in 34 minutes at the best gliding speed if still air 
conditions are assumed and the aeroplane is flying on its’ cruise altitude FL260. Naturally this 
value becomes smaller in take-off and landing situations where the current altitude is lower. 
Thus the risk period gives some flexibility in the compliance of the rule. 
 
Figure 1. Relation between the risk period and the maximum flight time from adequate aerodrome. 
Regarding the determination of landing site’s acceptability, the Opinion 06/2015 [4] gives 
several criteria for operators to be considered. For example, the width of the landing area 
should be at least 45 m and the length should allow the aeroplane to completely stop within 
the available surface, taking into account the slope and the type of the surface. It is also 
recommended to select, if possible, landing sites with a circular shape as they allow multiple 
approach paths depending on the wind and obstacles around the landing area. 
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On the other hand, if the landing site was an aerodrome, the same landing requirements would 
apply to single-engined aeroplanes as for any other performance class B aeroplanes 
(CAT.POL.A.330/335). 
United States 
Unlike EASA, FAA has permitted commercial operations of single-engined turbine as well as 
piston aeroplanes in instrumental flight rules (IFR) and at night since 1997 under Part 135 
regulations. The FAA justified the new allowance by diminishing accidents caused by the 
VFR flights turned into IMC flights in regions like Alaska. 
There’s no specific approval to be applied for single engine IFR (SEIFR) but multiple 
additional requirements exist for single-engined aeroplanes like equipment, maintenance and 
pilot certification requirements. There are also no risk period limitations and the performance 
requirements are basically the same as for any other commuter class aeroplanes. However, the 
regulation § 135.181 demands that a single-engined aeroplane may be operated over-the-top-
of-clouds conditions only if the forecasted weather allows flight under VFR and under the 
ceiling (if a ceiling exists) and that a descent under VFR is possible if the engine fails. [8] 
Notable is also the fact that there are no specific requirements about the need for 
predetermined emergency landing sites along the route. Thus the same alternate aerodrome 
requirements apply to single-engined aeroplanes as well. 
Australia 
CASA approves single-engined aeroplanes for charter or regular public transport operations 
that involve the carrying of passengers for hire or reward under night VFR and IFR if the 
operator is approved by CASA to conduct the operations (ASETPA) and the operations are 
conducted with a turbine-powered aeroplane approved by CASA for those operations [12] 
(174B (d) (ii) & 175A (d) (2)). Thus commercial operation of piston aeroplanes under night 
VFR and IFR is prohibited. 
The ASETPA requirement defines a safety distance similar to the risk period suggested by 
EASA. The ASETPA safety distance is the maximum still air distance travelled in 15 minutes 
at the aeroplane’s normal still air cruise speed plus the distance to glide to a 1000 feet above 
ground level (AGL) over a suitable landing area. [13] 
Regarding the performance limitations, CAO Section 20.7.4 [14] gives further regulations for 
single-engined propeller-driven aeroplanes having a maximum take-off weight not in excess 
of 5 700 kg in regular public transport operations. These are similar to regulations established 
in Section 20.7.2 [10] for multi-engined aeroplanes but for example in landing situation the 
landing distance required shall be multiplied with a value of 1.43. 
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2.2 Risk Factors 
This section aims to examine the risk factors, which are related to commercial operation of a 
small aeroplane in general. These factors should to be taken into account in the flight planning 
process while estimating the overall risk level of individual flight operation. The risk factors 
are categorised to four different groups, which will be further utilised and quantified in the risk 
assessments carried out in Section 4. 
2.2.1 Aircraft 
Performance class B aeroplanes are defined as propeller driven aeroplanes. Although there’s 
no evidence that turboprop engines would be less reliable than jet engines because of their 
similar technology, piston engines have often been considered to be less reliable because of 
their greater number of moving parts. There are also differences in the redundancy levels of 
these engine types. Turbine engines are often more sophisticated with more intelligence and 
self-diagnostics. All the critical subsystems are at least doubled and performance limitation 
exceedances are continually monitored using automatic trend monitoring systems. 
Besides the engine type, the number of engines has an impact to the risk level. One can easily 
say that the second engine doubles the safety but this is a misleading perception as most light 
twins may lose up to 80 % of their thrust if one engine fails. Thus there might not be enough 
power to hold the altitude or fly safely with only one engine. However, this is totally 
dependent of the performance of the aeroplane model in question. A problematic issue is also 
the different flight profile of the twin-engined aeroplanes. Because of the second engine, these 
aeroplanes usually have higher airspeeds, higher service ceiling, increased fuel load, and a 
tendency for aeroplane to yaw in an engine failure situation. [15] 
Depending of the aeroplane model, some performance class B aeroplanes may have a 
pressurisation system, which affects to cruise altitudes. These aeroplanes are able to fly higher 
but there’s also a risk of pressurisation failure, which can make the crew and passengers 
unconscious. On the other hand, a higher cruise altitude gives a pilot more time to locate a 
landing site in the case of power loss. 
An important factor is also the redundancy of avionics installed to the aeroplane. Although all 
the regulation structures, part of which was briefly covered in the previous section, require 
backup instruments in case of electrical power faults, these backup instruments rarely cover all 
the functions of the original units. Especially if engine failure occurs in a single-engined 
aeroplane, the avionics have to rely solely on battery power as the engine is the only source of 
continuous electrical power. In order that enough power is left for landing gears and high lift 
devices, some nonessential devices must be switched off. Thus, the situation awareness of the 
pilot may deteriorate and this consequently increases the risk of an accident. 
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2.2.2 Environment 
According to earlier studies, about two-thirds of all general aviation (GA) accidents that occur 
in instrument meteorological conditions are fatal, a rate that is three times higher than the 
fatality rate of all GA accidents [16]. Poor visibility, which can be a result of e.g. low cloud 
ceilings, fog, rain or snow, complicates the determination of the true aeroplane’s position in 
respect to altitude and location especially under approach and landing situation. Night 
operations in IMC make the situation even more challenging. In addition, thunderstorms cause 
severe turbulence, which alone can cause the aeroplane to fall down if proper forecasts have 
not been obtained. 
The following figures illustrate the effect of weather and lighting conditions to the risk of 
unsuccessful forced landing following an engine failure on a single-engined turbine aeroplane. 
 
Figure 2. A risk profile example for day VMC. [6] 
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Figure 3. A risk profile example for night IMC. [6] 
As Figure 2 and Figure 3 show, poor visibility reduces the available time for visual contact 
with runway threshold and thus increases the risk for unsuccessful forced landing. In addition, 
strong windshear makes the azimuth corrections harder and steers the aeroplane off the right 
glideslope because of its rapid change in speed and direction and a loss of lift in certain 
conditions [17]. This can lead to aeroplane’s collision with a terrain and in this case fatal 
injuries to crew and passengers are likely. 
In case of icing conditions, there’s also a risk for freezing of windshield or flight control 
surfaces if anti-icing/de-icing is not working properly after engine malfunction. In such case, 
besides the deteriorated situational awareness, there’s a serious risk that the aeroplane rapidly 
develops unacceptable flying characteristics. Also the performance may become degraded to 
the point where the assumed gliding range becomes unachievable. 
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In addition to hail storms, bird strikes and volcanic ash are also placed under environment 
category. Common to all of these are that they can seriously damage engines and therefore can 
lead to loss of thrust. Furthermore, hail storms and bird strikes can shatter the windshield, 
radar canopy and flight surfaces. These occur more often at low altitudes during take-off and 
approach phases. Volcanic ash on the other hand can accumulate at higher altitudes in clouds. 
The ash particles are often so small that they do not show up on aeroplanes’ weather radars or 
air traffic control’s radars. If the ash encounter is severe, the ash can cause major corrosion to 
exposed surfaces. 
2.2.3 Sector 
Essential in the risk assessment is also the route to be flown. It’s more risky to fly over an 
ocean or mountains than over a flat surface with a plenty of aerodromes and open fields in the 
range. As previously noted, regulations limit the distance how far an aeroplane can fly from 
adequate aerodrome. In case of single-engined aerodromes, the 15 minutes risk period per 
flight suggested by EASA gives some flexibility for operators [4]. However, it can be 
problematic if an operator wants to extend the risk period by intermediate landings. In this 
way the operator gets every time another 15 minutes to be used for the next leg. It can be 
easily concluded that it’s less risky to fly straight to the desired location than having stopovers 
during journey because in light of statistics, take-off and landing are the most risky part of a 
flight. 
When considering the aerodromes, properties such as runway length, runway condition, 
brightness and the amount of runway lighting equipment, adequacy of navigation aids, air 
traffic control facilities and the level of firefighting and rescue services affect the safety of the 
flight. In today’s world, also the level of security in the aerodromes has an effect on aviation 
safety by preventing illegal acts during flights. 
2.2.4 Flight Crew 
Factors like pilot error and crew inexperience combined with other previously mentioned 
factors constitute the greatest percentage of accident causes. Other indirect sources of human 
error are the mistakes made e.g. in maintenance and air traffic control. If the crew is not 
appropriately trained, it might have difficulties to correctly identify abnormal situations and 
follow correct standard operating procedures before the situation changes to an emergency. 
Cold weather operations also require expertise from the crew by correctly using de-icing fluids 
and on-board anti-icing/de-icing equipment in order to prevent accumulation of ice on the 
aeroplane’s wings and fuselage. 
Long exposition to heavy mental workloads causes stress that can lead to fatigue and 
deterioration in work performance. Under stressful conditions, diminished performance may 
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cause unsafe behaviour and generate errors that may result in fatal accidents. [17] In addition 
to medical related incapacitation, the pilot might become incapacitated by subtle 
incapacitation, which refers to progressive degradation of a pilot's cognitive skills and 
capability due to fatigue. 
There has also been some evidence that the age of the pilot creates a risk factor as aging is 
usually associated with diminished cognitive functions. However, the elevated risk has been 
reported rather modest or negligible with advancing age when comparing 60 year-old aviators 
and older with a reference group of pilots consisting of the ages of 30-39 years. [15] Instead, 
flight experience, as measured by total flight time at baseline, has showed a significant 
protective effect against the risk of crash involvement [18]. 
Many aviation authorities have recently begun to emphasise the importance of crew resource 
management (CRM). It was developed to create greater awareness of human error, 
identification methods and mitigation strategies. Also, in the case of fatigue, the aim is to 
teach employees to recognize the human factors and the resulting error trajectories in good 
time, and to try to avoid them and their consequences. [1] It is up to the organisation how well 
the CRM has been adopted as part of the organisation culture. 
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3 Scientific Approach to Risk Analysing Methods 
3.1 Previous Research 
In this section, different risk analysing methods are briefly introduced. These include: 
 Fault and Event Tree Analysis; 
 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis; 
 As Low as Reasonably Practicable Method; 
 Monte Carlo Simulation; 
 Bow-Tie and ARMS; 
 Aviation Safety Risk Model; 
 Analytical Hierarchy Process; and 
 Flight Operations Risk Assessment System. 
3.1.1 Fault and Event Tree Analysis 
The often used risk diagnostics tools in aviation have been different variations of Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). These can be classified as rather reactive 
analysis tools as they rely heavily on existing accident statistics data in the evaluation of the 
risk. They have been extensively utilized for example by FAA [19] and EASA [4] in their 
rulemaking processes. The methods are based on the utilisation of Boolean algebra to combine 
individual risks, which in result can cause an accident to happen. 
Fault tree and event tree analysis are similar and often complimentary but they focus on 
opposite sides of an undesired event. Whereas FTA is concerned with analysing the faults, 
which might lead to an event, ETA is interested in stopping an event from escalating. The 
analyses are illustrated using Boolean diagrams with ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ gates and if they are used 
concurrently, the resulting diagram resembles a bow-tie (see Figure 7). 
Like the name of FTA suggests, FTAs are presented in a tree format, where the starting point 
is the undesired event and it is set on top of the diagram. The immediate fault conditions, 
which have caused the top event, are set underneath. These can be further divided to any other 
subsequent faults until only primary failures are left. Logical ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ gates are used 
to illustrate the dependencies between the faults (see the left diagram in Figure 4). 
ETAs are also presented in tree format but they are often presented in horizontal hierarchy, 
where the initiating event is set to the left and all consequential events branch progressively to 
the right. Each node has two options whether the consequential event has happened or not. As 
a result, the diagram shows multiple different combinations of sequential events as a total 
outcome (see the right diagram in Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Basic principle of FTA (left) and ETA (right). [20] 
To model aviation accidents, the faults can be depicted as risk factors, which have certain 
likelihood. These risk factors are either direct or indirect occurrences that have a contribution 
to an accident. Events on the other hand can be depicted as escalation factors, which may 
aggravate the initiating event. 
After the risk factors are identified and their causal relationships are established, the risk 
factors are often quantified. A numerical probability based on either statistical data or expert 
judgement is established for each factor. The frequency λ is reported as occurrences per unit of 
time, e.g. accidents per flight hour (1/fh). The total probability P is calculated as 
 𝑃 = 𝜆𝑡, (1) 
where the parameter t is the exposure time. 
To calculate the total risk, two well-established rules of combination are used for each risk 
factor. In the fault tree analysis, all probabilities sitting below an ‘OR’ gate are summed given 
that the probabilities are individual to each other. In turn, all probabilities sitting below an 
‘AND’ gate are multiplied. 
In event tree analysis, after the probabilities for each escalation factor are established, the final 
outcome probability Y1 is achieved by following each individual track and multiplying the 
probabilities of the initiating event and all the factors along the track. To calculate the 
probability of the risk factor not happening, the complement of the probability should be used, 
for example N1 = 1 - Y1. 
The disadvantage of FTA and ETA is that they do not take into account the severity of the 
consequences when quantifying risk factors. Thus a risk consisting of severe but rarely 
occurring factors can result in smaller risk value than the risk value resulted from negligible 
and frequent factors. For that reason many more profound methods have been developed. 
 15 
3.1.2 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
From the perspective of proactive risk assessment, Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) was developed in the 1960s by the aerospace industry. Since then, it has 
been extensively used in many other industries to help ensure the safety and reliability of 
products. In this method, every failure mode of each system component is evaluated and their 
consequences to the total system behaviour are then assessed. The criticality part is used to 
prioritise the failures for corrective action based on the probability of the item failure mode 
and the severity of its effects. Without the criticality part the method is known as Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). FMECA has been extensively applied for example by 
US Department of Defence in the 1980s [21]. Mathematically the equation (1) is converted to 
the following form 
 𝐶𝑁𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖𝜆𝑝𝑡, (2) 
in which CN is the criticality number, α is the failure mode and β is the failure-effect 
probability. This way the severity can be calculated for all failure modes of each risk factor. 
The combination of each factor can be then calculated in a same way as in the FTA. An 
alternative method called Risk Priority Number (RPN) method has also been developed but it 
is mostly utilised in manufacturing industries such as automotive companies. [22] 
However, FMECA has often been criticised for a dilution phenomenon. For example, it is 
usually difficult to give precise evaluations for the variables in case there is a lack of statistical 
data to be used. Furthermore, different sets of the factors can produce exactly the same output 
value but the hidden implications may be totally different. Thus the results are strongly 
sensitive to variations in the criticality factor evaluations and there’s a risk that the results are 
not valid. For that reason, FMECA is often incorporated with fuzzy linguistic systems. [22] 
3.1.3 As Low as Reasonably Practicable Method 
In the risk evaluation process, one has to keep in mind that a risk can never be fully eliminated 
in hazardous industries like aviation. A method called As Low as Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP) was formally developed in UK in the early 1990s to implement the concept of ‘goal 
setting’ regulations. The method defines an upper limit of risk that can be tolerated in any 
circumstances and a lower limit below which risk is of no practical interest as shown in Figure 
5. For example, EASA has utilised the goal setting in its SET-IMC rulemaking process by 
establishing a target fatal accident rate of 1.3∙10-6 per flight hour [4]. In the process of 
establishing risk acceptance criteria, regulators have to take into account both ‘reason’ and 
‘practicability’. Besides the technological aspect, also social views should be considered. [23] 
 16 
 
Figure 5. Example of typical levels of risk and ALARP as based on UK experience in nuclear power industry. [23] 
However, some studies argue that there are a number of areas of concern about the validity of 
the ALARP approach. These include representativeness, morality, philosophy, political reality 
and practicality. An important, and in some respects fundamental, difficulty is that the risk 
acceptance criteria are not fully open to public scrutiny and can appear to be settled by 
negotiation. [23] 
3.1.4 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is a quantitative tool to simulate an accident risk by using a 
mathematical model of the risk scenario. It outputs a numerical risk probability value, which 
can be compared to ALARP target levels for example. The mathematical model is based on 
dynamic stochastic models of each relevant agent in the scenario. The agents represent the risk 
factors, which have a certain risk probability distribution. All the causal relationships and 
dynamic sequences between the agents are also specified in a conditional risk tree format. The 
model is then used to simulate the cooperation of all the agents with certain randomisers up to 
several thousand times to achieve a risk probability distribution for the overall risk. A graph 
can be generated to elicit an effect of one parameter change to overall risk (see Figure 6). [24] 
The challenge of Monte Carlo simulation is that it leans heavily on quantitative data, which 
may not always be available or is very limited. Therefore, statistical data must often be 
complemented with domain expertise to estimate the probability density function for the 
possible values of each parameter. Furthermore, the simulation is always more or less a 
simplification of the risk scenario as it cannot identify all the dynamic dependencies of each 
risk factor and some hazards may be totally uncovered. The bias and uncertainty of the model 
should be carefully compared against the reality. [24] 
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Figure 6. The collision risk for active runway crossing operation as simulated by Monte Carlo method. [24] 
3.1.5 Bow-Tie and ARMS 
Whereas the above mentioned methods can be categorised as rather quantitative methods, 
probably the two well-known and established qualitative methods in the implementation of 
SMS are Bow-Tie (Figure 7) and Aviation Risk Management Solutions (ARMS) (Figure 8). 
The methodology of Bow-Tie is simple and it has been popular since many decades. It 
involves systematic identification of major threats, assessment of causes (FTA) and 
consequences (ETA) associated to the threats and definition of specific control measures and 
recovery means that need to be implemented and maintained to reduce and control risks. The 
process is iterative and it is often developed by a team of experts and safety analysts. [25] 
ARMS method is much more recent and it has been specifically developed for operational risk 
assessment in aviation organisations. It consists of both retrospective and prospective risk 
assessment, where Event Risk Classification (ERC) and Safety Issue Risk Assessment (SIRA) 
are the applications respectively. The first one focuses on the events that actually happened 
within an organisation whereas the latter generates a log for the continuous assessment of risks 
and control actions, through safety barriers, providing a means for safety supervision. [25] 
 
Figure 7. Concept of Bow-Tie model. [25] 
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Figure 8. Safety Issue Risk Assessment of the ARMS methodology. [25] 
The Bow-Tie and ARMS methods are very similar with the evaluation of causes and 
consequences. However, ARMS tends to lean more on the specific choice of expert judgement 
made by the group of safety analysts. This enables a rapid determination of risks associated to 
hazards that need to be assessed. This aspect on the other hand coincides with the most 
important drawbacks as the extensive use of expert judgement may result in the evaluation of 
risks that are logical but not substantially credible if epistemological aspects are not precisely 
followed. [25] 
3.1.6 Aviation Safety Risk Model 
Another useful risk analysis method is the Aviation Safety Risk Model (ASRM), which was 
developed with the collaboration of NASA and FAA in the early 2000s. Whereas FTA and 
ETA are described as inductive reasoning, this method can be described merely as deductive 
reasoning. It utilises Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN), which provide causal structures for 
aircraft accident modelling. In this application, the BBN is constructed by nodes (ovals), 
which represent causal risk factors or precursors in aircraft accidents, decision nodes 
(rectangles), which represent technology or risk intervention insertions, and arcs (arrows), 
which represent probabilistic causal relationships between the variables (see Figure 9). The 
probabilities of the causal influences between the nodes are then quantified using Conditional 
Probability Tables (CPT). For example, if X represents the top node (the accident scenario) 
and Y1, Y2, …, Yn represent the parent nodes (the risk factors), the probability of the top node 
in the CPT can be designated as P(X | Y1, Y2, …, Yn). [26] 
In comparison to FTA, the conditional causalities of the risk factors and precursors in the 
BBNs are often estimated using “beliefs” rather than simple assumptions made using ‘AND’ 
or ‘OR’ gates. The strength of the belief is expressed by the numbers in the conditional 
probability tables. The risk mitigation effects of technologies and risk interventions are also in 
the form of conditional probabilities allowing the relative risk reduction to be evaluated. [26] 
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Figure 9. Example BBN for Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT). [26] 
The models can be quantified using a mixture of accident data, if available, and expert 
judgement made by domain experts. However, to achieve objective results, the expert 
judgment must be quantified through a structured and traceable process. To model human and 
organisational error probabilities in the BBNs, the ASRM utilises Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS). This is a classification scheme which has been developed 
to capture and analyse the different types of human errors that occur. [26] 
3.1.7 Analytical Hierarchy Process 
Similar to ASRM is another technique called Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which was 
first introduced in 2004. Likewise, it makes use of accident data as well as expert judgement 
by first obtaining the proportionate occurrence rate of causal factors from accident reports, 
where fatalities or serious injuries were reported and then combining this information with 
expert judgment on the relative importance of the flight attributes. This allows the 
development of importance weights for different flight characteristics in a decision process. 
The result is an index number used in identifying the comparative risk of flights operated 
under the category of general aviation. It is achieved with an equation 
 𝑅(𝑓) = ∑𝑃(𝑓𝑖)𝑊(𝑓𝑖), (3) 
in which R(f) is the risk for a flight f associated with a particular hazard and phase of flight, fi 
is the ith flight attribute (flight phase, pilot total experience, pilot recent experience, identified 
hazard), P(fi) is the statistical proportion of accidents with the flight attribute fi resulting in 
fatality or serious injury and W(fi) is the importance weight for characteristic fi. [27] 
The flight attributes are categorised into hierarchies as presented in Figure 10. The top level of 
the hierarchy is the context of the investigation. On level two, there’s three broad categories 
and these are further refined into smaller subcategories. The proportion of each attribute’s 
occurrence is determined using accident databases and this is multiplied with importance 
weights, which are established by pairwise comparison with other flight attributes at the same 
level. The summing is made along a path from the low-level attribute up to the top level. [27] 
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Figure 10. The AHP risk hierarchy of flight attributes. [27] 
3.1.8 Flight Operations Risk Assessment System 
Flight Operations Risk Assessment System (FORAS) is another indexing technique to 
proactively assess aviation risks. The project was originally started in 1997 by Icarus 
Committee, which is affiliated with the Flight Safety Foundation of USA. [28] Like the AHP, 
FORAS makes use of individual risk factors, which are presented as a hierarchical structure 
consisting of the top event (root node) and causal operation risks (child notes) (see Figure 11). 
The decomposition from the parent node is made until input data can be directly obtained from 
actual operations. [29] 
 
Figure 11. An example of hierarchical structure for Approach and Landing Risk Value (ALRV) used in FORAS. [29] 
The distinction between the AHP and the FORAS is that the FORAS model expresses the 
causal relations between nodes by rules, which are assessed in a linguistic manner. Each risk 
and its causal risks in the FORAS model represent a fuzzy inference system. The number of 
rules in a fuzzy inference system depends on how many linguistic terms are used to assess a 
causal risk in each risk component. [29] 
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In the example of Figure 11, if two linguistic terms are used, the fuzzy inference rules can be 
formulated using Table 1 below. The consequence C2 is quantified by a number 1, 4, 6 or 10 
depending on the states of T1 and T2. The boundaries for terms ‘low’ and ‘high’ are 
predetermined by using membership functions. 
Table 1. A table format of fuzzy inference system when using the Sugeno system. [29] 
C2:  T2 
  Low High 
T1 
Low 1 4 
High 6 10 
 
Often multiple rules are inferring at the same time and the combination of their consequences 
is calculated using weighted average with an equation 
 𝑟 =
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑧𝑗𝑐𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑧𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
, (4) 
where r is the risk index, cj is the membership value of jth rule’s consequent, wj is the weight 
of the jth rule and zj is the firing strength of the jth rule defined by the membership functions 
of the antecedents. The order of the fuzzy evaluations in the hierarchy table (Figure 11) is 
from bottom to top. [29] 
The advantage of fuzzy inference system is that it provides a natural representation of the 
knowledge in an expert system and automates the process of risk assessment. FORAS has 
already some commercial applications used by airlines for examining risk trends, assessing 
risks associated with each flight and quantifying the effects of making safety-related changes. 
The quantitative risk index allows comparisons between flights and facilitates the 
communication of safety issues throughout the organization. [28] 
Many alternative applications utilising the fuzzy inference system have been developed. 
Whereas FORAS uses the Sugeno system that has real numbers in the consequence part [29], a 
risk assessment can also use the Mamdani system, which on the other hand adopts linguistic 
expressions in the consequence. This requires a separate defuzzification procedure in the 
inference in order to achieve quantitative results [30]. In overall, fuzzy rule-based analysis is 
highly adoptable and it can be modified to take input from both numerical accident data and 
expert judgement. 
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3.2 Applicable Analysing Methods 
In this section, the analysing techniques considered applicable for this thesis are reviewed 
mathematically in an extent that their further utilisation is possible. The techniques are the 
weighted hierarchical model, originally introduced in Section 3.1.7, and the fuzzy rule-based 
analysis, originally introduced in Section 3.1.8. 
3.2.1 Weighted Hierarchical Model 
The first step in the process of developing a weighted hierarchical model is to determine the 
objective of the assessment and define the case operation. The next step is to identify all the 
hazards, which are related to this operation and determine their causal relationships. This 
forms a hierarchical tree structure as illustrated in Figure 12. At the top level, the risk factors 
should be the ones forming the broadest categories. These factors can be depicted as parent 
nodes while the objective of the assessment is the root node. Each parent node can be 
decomposed to more specific child notes and these can be further decomposed to smaller 
categories until there are only indivisible risk factors left. These nodes without any child node 
are called leaves. [28] 
 
Figure 12. An example of a hierarchical model. 
After the hierarchical model has been established, the weighting of the risk factors can be 
made by pairwise comparison. In the pairwise comparison, the experts can compare any two 
elements at the same level of the hierarchy in the system and provide a numerical value for the 
ratio of their importance. [27] 
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Let x1, x2, …, xn be the set of risk factors in the same group and aij be the weight ratio of risk 
factors xi and xj, where i = 1, 2, ..., n and j = 1, 2, ..., n. Then, the pairwise comparison can be 
conducted as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Principle of pairwise comparison. [30] 
 x1 x2 … xn 
x1 a11 a12 … a1n 
x2 a21 a22 … a2n 
… … … … … 
xn an1 an2 … ann 
 
If kept in mind that a11, a22, …, ann = 1 and aji = 1/aij, the number of judgements N required for 
a group having n risk factors can be calculated using an equation [30] 
 𝑁 =
𝑛∙(𝑛−1)
2
. (5) 
Mathematically it is easiest to combine the weight ratios into a matrix A [30]: 
 𝑨 = [
𝑎11 ⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑎𝑛1 ⋯ 𝑎𝑛𝑛
]. (6) 
When developing this matrix, variables that are judged of equal importance are often assigned 
the value 1. A criterion that is judged to have extreme importance compared to another is often 
assigned the value 9. However, in different applications there are presented other possible 
scales as well. [30] Table 3 shows an example to determine a weight ratio by using a linguistic 
scale. 
Table 3. A linguistic scale for a weight ratio range 1…6. [31] 
Weight ratio Description 
1 Just equal (JE) 
2 Almost equally important (AEI) 
3 Weakly more important (WMI) 
4 Strongly more important (SMI) 
5 Very strongly more important (VSMI) 
6 Absolutely more important (AMI) 
 
It is also expected that each expert gives slightly different weight ratios in the pairwise 
comparison. In this case it is recommended to calculate a geometric mean of the given weight 
ratios to be inserted to the matrix. If assumed that there are m experts in the decision making 
process, the geometric mean can be calculated using an equation 
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 𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 = √𝑎1 ∙ 𝑎2 ∙ … ∙ 𝑎𝑚
𝑚
, (7) 
where ai is the importance judged by expert (ith) [27]. To determine the relative priorities of 
the risk factors to be used in the hierarchical model, one must calculate the eigenvector X 
resulting from the largest eigenvalue λ. This can be done with an equation 
 𝑨𝑿 = 𝜆𝑿 ↔ (𝑨 − 𝜆𝑰)𝑿 = 0. (8) 
However, the eigenvalues must first be solved with an equation 
 det(𝑨 − 𝜆𝑰) = 0. (9) 
As a result, the method outputs n priority weights w to be used in the risk assessment: 
 𝑿 = [
𝑤1
⋮
𝑤𝑛
]. (10) 
In addition, the vector should be multiplied with a multiplier t ∈ ℝ so that each component is 
in its universe ∈ [0, 1]. [27] In case there are no real eigenvalues present, the eigenvalue λ 
should be set to unity, λ = 1 [30]. 
It is also possible to combine the weight ratios of all the risk factors to the same matrix 
regardless of their level and group. In this case the matrix gets the block diagonal matrix form 
and this allows simplifying the computational complexity. In this form, the matrix has a 
submatrix Aij for each relevant group in its diagonal. If assumed that there are a total of p risk 
factors in the hierarchical model, the matrix gets a form 
 𝑨 = [
𝑨𝟏𝟏 0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0 𝑨𝒑𝒑
] =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑎11 ⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑎𝑛1 ⋯ 𝑎𝑛𝑛
0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0 𝑎𝑝𝑝]
 
 
 
 
, (11) 
where app represents the top node and equals 1 like also all the other ratios aii in the matrix 
diagonal. [30] 
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3.2.2 Fuzzy Rule-based Analysis 
Fuzzy logic systems are knowledge-based or rule-based analysing tools to systematically 
transform human knowledge into non-linear mapping. Its fundamental speciality is that it 
utilises linguistic words, i.e. fuzzy sets in the assessment of overall risk. These fuzzy sets are 
characterised by continuous membership functions, which prescribe the boundaries for the 
linguistic definitions. [5] Each input and output variable has its own set of membership 
functions. In theory, the input and output variables can be any kind of factors having causality 
but in the case of safety risk assessment, the inputs are often prescribed as risk factors and the 
outputs as consequences. Fuzzy IF–THEN rules are then established to make a relation 
between consequences and a set of risk factors with a certain linguistic risk level. [28] For 
example, the following is a fuzzy IF–THEN rule consisting of two inputs and one output: 
IF the risk factor 1 is low and risk factor 2 is average, THEN the consequence is moderate. 
In the above example low and average determine the state of the output to be moderate. 
Depending on the number of fuzzy sets, a certain size of fuzzy rule base must be created to 
include a collection of IF–THEN rules determined by experts. [5] Based on the states of the 
inputs, specific rules are then retrieved form the library to determine the state of the output. 
Typically the fuzzy logic system consists of four components: the fuzzy rule base, the fuzzy 
inference engine, the fuzzifier and the defuzzifier (see Figure 13). This configuration is called 
as Mamdani system. Without the defuzzifier, the configuration is called as Sugeno system. In 
this case the outputs are crisp numbers instead of fuzzy sets and therefore defuzzifier is not 
needed. [32] Basically fuzzifier/defuzzifier converts real-valued numbers to fuzzified numbers 
defined by fuzzy sets and vice versa. The fuzzy logic system does not limit the number of 
inputs and outputs but the most common configuration consists of 1-3 inputs and 1 output. 
 
Figure 13. An overview of a fuzzy logic system. 
 26 
In the next step, each of these components will be described in detail to get a better 
understanding of the mathematical and logical principles behind the Mamdani fuzzy logic 
system. The Sugeno system is distinctly similar but its membership functions in the 
consequent part are vertical lines (compare to Figure 14) and the output value is calculated 
using the equation (4). 
Fuzzifier 
For practical applications, the input of the fuzzy logic system is a real-valued number so it 
needs to be fuzzified before passing it to the fuzzy inference engine. The fuzzifier makes a 
mapping from a real-valued number x* = (x1
*
, x2
*, …, xN
*
) ∈ U ∈ ℝn to a fuzzy set Aj ∈ U 
using a membership function 𝜇
𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑥𝑖) (i = 1, 2, …, N) of the fuzzy set [5]. xi is in this case a 
component of the linguistic input variable x = (x1, x2, …, xN) ∈  U. A separate set of 
membership functions is often defined for each input component. 
In Figure 14, the terms “Very Low”, “Low” etc. are the available fuzzy sets and the 
membership functions define their boundaries. A membership function is often a piecewise-
defined triangular or trapezoidal function. For example, the triangular function has a form of 
 𝜇
𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑥𝑖) = {
0,
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑎)/(𝑏 − 𝑎),
(𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖)/(𝑐 − 𝑏),
0
  
𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑎
𝑎 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑏
𝑏 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑐
𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑐
. (12) 
However, the membership function does not have to follow the form of the equation above 
and it can adopt any other form as well depending on the application. In addition to triangular 
or trapezoidal-shaped membership functions, the function can also be Gaussian, bell or 
sigmoidal-shaped curve. [32] 
 
Figure 14. An example fuzzification of an input variable. [33] 
Often the input value is in transition region between two fuzzy sets like in Figure 14. In this 
case the both fuzzy sets are taken into account in the fuzzy inference engine and they both can 
contribute to the output risk level of the fuzzy system with their respective weights depending 
on the conjunction operator [33]. 
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Fuzzy Rule Base 
The fuzzy IF–THEN rules are the core of the fuzzy logic system as they combine all the other 
components and determine the output of the system. In case of multiple inputs with ‘AND’ 
conjunctions in between and single output, the rules have a theoretical form 
 𝑅𝑢(𝑗): 𝐼𝐹 𝑥1 𝑖𝑠 𝐴1
𝑗  𝐴𝑁𝐷 …𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑥𝑁 𝑖𝑠 𝐴𝑁
𝑗 , 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑁 𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝐵𝑗, (13) 
where Ru
(j)
 stands for jth rule (j = 1, 2, …, M), Aji (i = 1, 2, …, N) and B
j
 are fuzzy sets in Ui ∈ 
ℝ and V ∈ ℝ respectively and x = (x1, x2, …, xN) ∈ U and y ∈ V are input and output variables 
of the fuzzy system. [5] The fuzzy IF–THEN rules represent human knowledge in this 
framework so the rule base has to fulfil the following three conditions [5] [32]: 
1. The set of fuzzy IF–THEN rules has to be complete. This is true if for any x ∈ U, there 
exists at least one rule Ru
(j)
 in the form of the equation (13) in the rule base so that 
 𝜇𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑥𝑖) ≠ 0 (14) 
for all i = 1, 2, …, N. In other words, this means that, in any point of input space, there 
has to exist at least one rule in the rule base that ‘fires’, that is, the membership values 
of the input variables in the IF part has to be non-zero. 
2. The set of fuzzy IF–THEN rules has to be consistent. This is true when there is no 
rules with the same IF parts but different THEN parts. 
3. The set of fuzzy IF–THEN rules has to be continuous. This is true when there do not 
exist such neighbouring rules, whose THEN part fuzzy sets have empty intersection. 
This means that the flow from one rule to another must be fluent. 
Fuzzy Inference Engine 
The fuzzy inference engine is used to make a combination of multiple rules to get a mapping 
from a fuzzy set A
j
 in input space U to a fuzzy set B
j
 in output space V. A fuzzy IF–THEN rule 
can be interpreted as a fuzzy relation in the input–output product space U×V. The Mamdani’s 
interpretation is defined as 
 𝑅𝑢(𝑗) = ∫ 𝝁𝑹𝒖(𝒋)(𝒙, 𝑦)𝑈×𝑉 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦), (15) 
where the membership function 𝝁𝑹𝒖(𝒋)(𝒙, 𝑦) is a fuzzy relation of the jth rule. [32] 
The firing of a set of rules via the operation composition is called composition based inference. 
In it, all rules in the fuzzy rule base are combined into a single fuzzy relation U×V, which is 
then viewed as a single fuzzy IF–THEN rule. Thus, all the rules that have any truth in their 
premises will contribute to the fuzzy risk level expression. 
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The whole set of rules is then defined as 
 𝑅𝑢 = ⋃ 𝑅𝑢(𝑗)𝑀𝑗=1 , (16) 
where the symbol ∪ is defined as a union operator combining the individual rules. [32] 
The fuzzy relation found in the equation (15) can be calculated by implicating from antecedent 
to consequent. It is made with a T-norm operator [32] [33]: 
 𝝁𝑹𝒖(𝒋)(𝒙, 𝑦) = min(𝜇𝐴𝑗(𝒙), 𝜇𝐵𝑗(𝑦)). (17) 
Before this can be done, the inputs must be first fuzzified and a fuzzy operator must be applied 
to the fuzzified inputs in order to obtain one number that represents the result of the antecedent 
for that rule. To do this, a T-norm operator is applied to the input membership functions and 
𝜇𝐴𝑗(𝒙) can be expressed as [5] 
 𝜇𝐴𝑗(𝒙) = min(𝜇𝐴1
𝑗 (𝑥1), … , 𝜇𝐴𝑁
𝑗 (𝑥𝑁)). (18) 
In the equations (17) and (18), the min operator can be interpreted as a T-norm operator 
(‘AND’ conjunction) between the membership functions of two fuzzy sets. Likewise, the max 
operator is interpreted as an S-norm operator (‘OR’ conjunction). 
After the fuzzy relations of each rule have been determined, the output fuzzy sets need to be 
aggregated so that the result is a combined single fuzzy set. The input to the aggregation 
process is the list of truncated output functions returned by the implication process for each 
rule. The output of the aggregation process is one fuzzy set for each output variable. [33] The 
equation (16) can be rewritten with an S-norm operator [5] [32]: 
 𝝁𝑹𝒖(𝒙, 𝑦) = max𝑗=1
𝑀 [𝝁𝑹𝒖(𝒋)(𝒙, 𝑦)] = max𝑗=1
𝑀 [min(𝜇𝐴𝑗(𝒙), 𝜇𝐵𝑗(𝑦))]. (19) 
The output of the aggregation process is achieved with generalised modus ponens [5]: 
 𝝁𝑩(𝑦) = sup 𝑡(𝝁𝑨(𝒙), 𝝁𝑹𝒖(𝒙, 𝑦)). (20) 
Defuzzifier 
Defuzzification is a process, where the fuzzy results are transformed into a precise output z* 
number after the aggregated output fuzzy set is derived. It is defined as a mapping from fuzzy 
set B
j
 ∈ V to a real-valued number z* ∈ V ∈ ℝn. There are up to seven different methods 
available to do the defuzzification but the most common is the center of mass (area) method, 
also known as centroid method [33] [34]: 
 𝑧∗ =
∫ 𝑧𝝁𝑩(𝑦) 𝑑𝑧
∫ 𝝁𝑩(𝑦) 𝑑𝑧
. (21) 
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Figure 15 illustrates graphically the implication of the antecedents, the aggregation of the 
consequent and the defuzzification process for the case of two inputs, one output and two rules. 
 
Figure 15. An example fuzzy inference system (Mamdani) with two inputs, one output and two rules. [34] 
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3.3 Evaluation of Analysing Methods 
This section proposes a model, which will be utilised in the case examples defined in Chapter 
4. The model is based on the methods described in Section 3.2. These are the weighted 
hierarchical analysis, i.e. analytical hierarchy process, and the fuzzy rule-based analysis. The 
objective is to integrate these two methods into one model so that they complement each other 
and that the model outputs realistic risk estimates based on expert judgement and statistics. 
The resulting method is similar to AHP-FCE, which stands for analytical hierarchy process 
and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation. This AHP-FCE method has been originally developed in 
[35]. It has also been covered for example in [30], [31], [36] and [37] with slightly different 
variations. So far the method has been mainly utilised in the areas of body physical exercise 
risk, behaviour-based safety management and disaster management. Although fuzzy logic 
systems have been covered in the field of flight operations safety risk management to some 
extent, as for example in [28] and [29], they have not yet taken place as a widespread risk 
evaluation tool. 
In the original form of AHP-FCE, the risk evaluation is conducted by building a hierarchical 
structure and then implementing a fuzzy transformation 
 𝑩 = 𝑨 ⊕ 𝑹 ↔ (𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑛) = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑚)⨁ [
𝑟11 ⋯ 𝑟1𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑟𝑚1 ⋯ 𝑟𝑚𝑛
], (22) 
where 𝑏𝑗 = min(1, ∑ (𝑎𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑖𝑗)
𝑚
𝑖=1 ) (j = 1, 2, …, n). In the above equation A represents relative 
weight vector, R is the fuzzy relation and B is the membership degree of the remark vj in 
evaluation remark vector V = (v1, v2, …, vn). In this context, n is number of membership 
functions, m is number of inputs and bj, ai, rij ∈ [0, 1]. The evaluation is executed through the 
hierarchy from the bottom level to the highest and multiplying the weights vector by the fuzzy 
relation matrix along each segment of the path. The result is calculated using an equation 
 𝑶 =
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
, (23) 
where O is a normalized vector of the overall weights of the risk remarks. [35] 
The above method has been characterised as greatly advantageous because the fuzzy 
environment is able to handle vague input factors and the use of hierarchical structure with a 
multilevel decision tree and approximate reasoning methods enables to handle complex, multi-
criteria and multilevel systems. [35] However, the method does not make use of a rule base 
and therefore it is not as intuitive and efficient as a full fuzzy logic system. Since then, some 
further studies have been published with the implementation of MATLAB
®
 and Simulink
®
 
environments, e.g. [36] [37]. With these modelling techniques many of the above mentioned 
limitations can be solved. The results of these studies have been promising and they encourage 
this thesis to further adopt and develop similar techniques. 
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3.3.1 Proposed Analysing Method 
As a result, a risk assessment method, which is illustrated in Figure 16, is proposed to be used 
in this thesis for the calculation of overall risk levels. 
 
Figure 16. Schematic diagram of the proposed weighted fuzzy hierarchy method for determining a risk level. 
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Next, a short description of each step in Figure 16 is provided: 
Step 1-2: The first step of the process is to determine the scope of the risk assessment, that is, 
the desired event for which the risk value is wanted to be calculated. Thereafter, all 
the risk factors and their subsequent subfactors related to that event should be 
identified. 
Step 3: The next step is to build a hierarchical tree structure for the risk factors as 
explained in Section 3.2.1. This is done in the Simulink
®
 environment. 
Step 4-5: The fuzzy logic systems for each subsystem are built with the graphical Fuzzy 
Logic Designer toolbox found in MATLAB
®
. In this application, Sugeno system is 
preferable because of its computational simplicity. The definition of membership 
functions should be made by using statistics and consultation of aviation experts. 
Step 6: The rule base is established by using a linear regression algorithm, which can be 
presented with an equation (refer also to the equation (13)) 
 𝐵𝑗 =
𝑞−1
𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑀−𝑆𝑢𝑚1
∙ (𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑗 − 𝑆𝑢𝑚1) + 1, (24) 
 where B
j
 = 1, 2, …, q is the fuzzy set of the output in the jth rule (j = 1, 2, …, M) 
and 𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑗 = ∑ (1 +
10∙𝑤𝑖−1
𝑝𝑖−1
∙ (𝐴𝑖
𝑗 − 1))𝑁𝑖=1  is the weighted sum of the input fuzzy 
sets A
j
i = 1, 2, …, pi (i = 1, 2, …, N). In this context, the fuzzy sets are presented 
with their corresponding index numbers (e.g. 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high). 
Compared to the AHP-FCE in the equation (22), the input weights in this case are 
integrated straight to the determination of risk consequents in the rule base, 
whereas in the AHP-FCE, the weighting is implemented in the implication phase. 
The method in the equation (24) is considered more effective in this case as the 
scaling of membership degrees downwards with weight coefficients (∈ [0, 1]) in 
the implication phase poses resolution problems in the output value determination 
phase. The justification of this algorithm is presented in Section 3.3.2. 
Step 7: The relative weights and the input values of the lowest level risk factors should be 
determined by using expert judgement. For the calculation of the priority weight 
vector, a pairwise comparison procedure, explained in Section 3.2.1, should be 
followed. This is implemented by conducting an online survey, which is sent to 
multiple aviation experts. The survey enquires one by one what the importance 
ratio between two risk factors is in the opinion of the expert. This is repeated for all 
the risk factors in the same category and all the categories in the hierarchy model 
are reviewed this way so that the weight ratio matrices for all the categories can be 
formed. The final matrices used in the assessment are received after geometric 
mean values of all the responses have been calculated. 
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Step 8: The calculation process consists of the calculation of priority weights and fuzzy 
logic outputs on each level. A custom function is programmed in the MATLAB
®
 
environment to determine the weight coefficients from the weight ratio matrices 
with the eigenvector algorithm introduced in Section 3.2.1. Another function is 
then implemented to pick these input weights and dynamically form the rule base 
for each fuzzy inference controller using the algorithm presented in step 6. 
Thereafter, the fuzzy inference controllers in the Simulink
®
 model can conduct the 
fuzzy evaluations on each level with similar methods introduced in Section 3.2.2. 
However, in the Sugeno system the min and max operators in the equations (17) - 
(19) are replaced with product and sum operators respectively and the equation (4) 
is used instead of the equation (21). However, it must be noted at this point that the 
rule weights presented in the equation (4) have a different meaning than the input 
weights used in this method. These rule weights are not used in this method and 
thus every rule has an equal weight of one. 
Step 9: The last but very important phase is the validation of the results. The first step is to 
verify the operation of a single fuzzy logic block so that it gives expected output 
values and therefore confirm that the developed analysing method is acceptable. 
Thereafter, multiple runs should be conducted with different input values and the 
results should be compared with each other. The aim is to determine whether the 
results are reasonable so that the model gives realistic and consistent results. After 
this is confirmed, the results should be checked against the acceptable limits 
established for the type of operation. If necessary, appropriate risk mitigation 
measures should be incorporated to the model. The validation aspects are covered 
more in Chapter 5 and risk mitigation measures in Chapter 6. 
  
 34 
3.3.2 Justification of the Linear Rule Base 
The main function of the equation (24) is to calculate the sum of each input’s fuzzy set and 
determine the risk consequent based on it. The indexes of the fuzzy sets are arranged so that 
the risk increases as the index gets larger so as a result, the risk consequent is a linear function 
of the risk antecedents’ sum. 
The rules are built systematically by going through all the possible combinations of each 
input’s fuzzy sets from smallest to largest. The consequents are adjusted so that the smallest 
sum of the fuzzy sets equals one and the largest sum equals q. The intermediate sums are 
interpolated between these two values. The number of rules is a product of each input’s 
number of fuzzy sets. If considered two inputs with two fuzzy sets each, the rule base has a 
structure as shown below: 
 𝐼𝐹 𝑥1 = {
1
1
2
2
}  𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑥2 = {
1
2
1
2
} , 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑁 𝑦 = {
1
⋮
⋮
𝑞
}. (25) 
By using this kind of systematic rule formation, the first two conditions on page 27 are 
fulfilled, i.e., the rule base is complete and consistent. However, as the method uses Sugeno 
based fuzzy inference system, the third condition is not directly applicable as only discrete 
numbers are used in the THEN part instead of fuzzy sets. Anyhow, the rule base is also 
automatically continuous as the consequents of all the rules with varying truth values are 
combined with the weighted average method, which always ensures the continuity of the 
output. 
As the equation (24) shows, each sum element, i.e., each input’s fuzzy set index is scaled 
based on the input’s total number of fuzzy sets and priority weight. This is done in order to 
normalise the results based on the varying total number of the fuzzy sets (some inputs may 
have more fuzzy sets to describe them and therefore this would artificially have more weight 
to the results) and then to adjust the results based on the priority weights acquired from the 
pairwise comparison. A usage example of the equation (24) is presented in Table 9 on page 52. 
Further validation aspects of this method are presented in Section 5.1. 
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4 Utilisation of Model-based Risk Analysis 
4.1 Creating a Risk Model 
This section defines the scopes of the case examples and determines the causality of the risk 
factors related to these examples as in step 1-2 of the flowchart in Figure 16. The case 
examples are an aerodrome and landing site determination case and a flight planning case. The 
risk factors are then structured to a hierarchical model as in step 3 of the flowchart. The 
general risk factors presented in Section 2.2 are utilised throughout the process. 
4.1.1 Aerodrome and Landing Site Determination 
Scope 
The scope of this case example is to determine the means to estimate the suitability of an 
aerodrome or landing site to be used either as a departure, en-route alternate or arrival point. 
The assessment is made by taking into account all the prevailing conditions of the flight and 
based on these, compute a numeric risk value for the aerodrome or landing site. The 
previously introduced fuzzy analysing method will be utilised for this case. 
As many statistics show, the departure and arrival constitute the largest risk proportion of a 
flight. When choosing aerodromes for take-off and landing, the properties and equipment of 
the aerodromes as well as the prevailing environment conditions form the riskiness of these 
flight phases. Aviation authorities have therefore established numerous risk mitigation 
measures to reduce accidents during departures and arrivals. As already briefly introduced in 
Section 2.1, these include, for example, runway length requirements. Furthermore, there are 
also provisions for weather minimums, which depend on, e.g., location of the aerodrome and 
installed approach systems. Operators are also obligated to conduct an aerodrome 
categorisation process based on these aerodrome parameters (AMC1 ORO.FC.105(b)(2);(c)). 
The airport category definitions are straight from EASA requirements, which classify 
aerodromes either as a class A, B or C. This classification takes into account for example 
approach procedures and performance limitations of the aerodrome as well as any other local 
specialities including unusual weather conditions, obstructions, physical layout, approach 
lighting systems etc. [7]. 
For SET aeroplanes, the suggested AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) requires that the operator 
establishes criteria for the assessment of each new route. This includes the identification and 
assessment of the continued acceptability of landing sites (obstacles, dimensions of the 
landing area, type of the surface, slope, etc.) along the route when no aerodrome is available. 
[4] [6] However, conducting a rationale assessment may be challenging as multiple risk 
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factors need to be taken into account on different importance levels. Furthermore, it may be 
difficult to ensure the continued validity of the assessment results as the chosen landing sites 
are often uncontrolled fields and possible modifications (new buildings, ditches, etc.) need to 
be detected by the operators themselves. Although this is not required for twin-engined 
performance class B aeroplanes, the en-route landing site determination would be useful 
especially for aeroplanes with a very little power reserve in OEI situation. 
As a result, the fuzzy logic method suits well for the determination of aerodrome and landing 
site risk levels. The weighted hierarchical fuzzy structure can take into account all the 
aerodrome and landing site parameters as well as the environmental aspects, which all affect 
to the likelihood of successful landing. In addition, the weighting enables to emphasise certain 
factors over others so that the fuzzy rules output more rationale results. The operators could 
therefore make use of this method to comply with the EASA requirements for aerodrome 
categorisation and landing site determination. Also the operators of small twin-engined 
aeroplanes could utilise the landing site determination method to improve their safety 
management system although EASA’s regulations do not demand the establishment of en-
route landing sites (see Section 2.1.1). 
Risk identification 
The model for aerodrome and landing site determination consists of aerodrome and landing 
site risks, which are amended with risks related to prevailing environment aspects (see Figure 
17). This is because, with certain environmental conditions, the risk for an unsuccessful 
landing (or take-off) may become too excessive although the aerodrome or landing site itself 
can be suitable in better conditions. As a result, the assessment is advised to be reproduced 
with many different environment risk combinations. The model is constructed so that, 
depending on the type of the location, either the aerodrome risk or landing site risk branch is 
chosen. 
The aerodrome risk node consists of airport category and subsequent risks related to runway 
performance. If the airport category has not been already predetermined, the model enables its 
simplified determination by using the main antecedents incorporated from AMC1 
ORO.FC.105(b)(2);(c). Otherwise the category value can be directly placed to the airport 
category node. The runway condition risk node consists of either the ratio between actual take-
off run required versus take-off run available or landing distance required versus landing 
distance available depending on which is applicable at that point. Furthermore, it includes the 
effective braking action, which is directly proportional to the friction coefficient of the runway. 
The landing site branch on the other hand consists of condition and dimension risks. At this 
point the landing site is assumed to be a plain field or road etc. The condition risk includes the 
information about the obstacles (tall masts near the landing site etc.), surface (grass, gravel, 
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asphalt etc.) and the landing site elevation. Dimension risk in turn takes into account the 
length, width and slope of the landing area. 
The environment branch in turn includes risks related to weather, lighting condition (amount 
of daylight) and forecasted severity of icing (low, medium, severe). The weather risk node is 
further modelled to be composed of runway visual range (RVR), which is proportional to 
reported visibility, intensity of precipitation (rain, snow fall etc.) and wind. In addition to wind 
speed, one must take into account also the direction of the wind and the intensity of gusts. The 
gust is defined as peak wind speed minus steady wind speed. 
Hierarchical model 
The figure below illustrates the hierarchical structure of the identified risk factors. The 
complete Simulink model of this aerodrome and landing site determination structure can be 
seen in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 17. The hierarchical structure for the aerodrome and landing site model. 
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4.1.2 Flight Planning 
Scope 
The scope of this case example is to realistically quantify the overall risk related to an 
individual flight operation of performance class B aeroplane. The aim is to determine how 
certain selections made in the flight planning phase affect the risk. Of special interest are 
parameters such as the number of engines and the engine type of the operated aeroplane. As in 
Section 2.1.2, many aviation authorities do not either permit the commercial operation of 
single-engined turbine aeroplanes in IMC or at night or they have established additional 
requirements to this kind of operations as they believe that these operations contain a higher 
risk. 
Especially EASA has emphasised the importance of proper route planning in the flight 
preparation phase. The agency believes that by reducing the time of risk period in a flight, the 
fatal accident risk can be greatly reduced. EASA has also established a numeric method in 
GM2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) proposed to be utilised by operators in order to verify that the 
amount of in-flight risk does not exceed certain limits [4] [6]. However, this method does not 
take into account other sources of risks and it’s highly sensitive to subjective judgement made 
by the operators. 
The fuzzy rule-based model developed for this case example aims to provide an alternative 
and more precise tool to be used by operators. As earlier mentioned, the ‘fuzzy’ environment 
provides an advanced platform to handle imprecise and ambiguous judgements. This is 
necessary as reactive interpreting of accident statistics alone is inappropriate. Furthermore, 
this method incorporates other risk sources as well to complement the route based risks and 
weights their consequences appropriately. The output will be a crisp, comparative risk value 
for each flight. The objective is that this method can be utilised for the operation of both 
single-engined as well as two-engined aeroplanes. 
Risk identification 
The planned flight primarily includes sector-based risk factors, which can be divided to risks 
encountered during departure, en-route and arrival phases of flight (see Figure 18). The 
departure and arrival risks are directly calculated using the risk model for aerodrome 
determination described previously. The en-route risk on the other hand is a combination of 
risk period usage, planned cruise altitude and the risk value for en-route alternates. To be 
conservative, the value for the last one is determined by finding the largest risk value of all the 
planned en-route alternates. The calculation of alternates is also done with the model in the 
previous section so that only the applicable branch of the model is chosen. 
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Moreover, the overall risk for a planned flight also depends largely on the flight crew and the 
operated aircraft. For that reason, the sector risk branch has been amended with a parallel 
flight crew risk and aircraft risk branches. Depending on their values, the combined risk value 
may become excessive with certain routes and thus some risks have to be mitigated in one of 
these areas. 
The flight crew branch is assumed to consist of pilot error and incapacitation risks. The pilot 
error risk is largely proportional to flight crew’s experience and training as well as their 
fatigue level. The experience can be readily described with the captain’s and co-pilot’s 
accumulated total, type-specific and recent flight hours whereas training level is measured by 
estimating the performance of crew resource management (CRM) and standard operating 
procedures (SOP). The fatigue level in turn can be derived from the duty hours and the 
number of previous sectors in the duty period. However, the incapacitation risk is much more 
difficult to be modelled as a risk for a serious acute medical issue during a flight can be 
attributed to numerous different cases. For simplicity, the age of each pilot is assumed to be 
the main contributor for the incapacitation risk. This is also amended with the information 
whether one of the pilots has operational multi-crew limitations (OMLs). 
The aircraft branch is decomposed to risks related to aircraft model, aircraft age and critical 
minimum equipment list (MEL) items. The most essential aspect of the aircraft model risk is 
the redundancy risk consisting of information about aircraft’s climb gradient in engine 
inoperative situation and critical safety equipment installations (reverser and anti-skid). This is 
amended with the reliability risks related to propulsion (engine and propeller) and other 
critical systems (pressurisation and electrical power). The reliability is described using 
numerical failure rates acquired mostly from statistics. They can be quantified by using unit 
occurrences per flight hour. The aircraft age is divided into model age, which tells the novelty 
of the aircraft model (not individual aircraft’s age), and the frequency of unexpected failures. 
The frequency of unexpected failures is considered to be a better indicator than individual 
aircraft age as also an old aircraft can be equally safe if it is maintained well and there’s little 
system failures between scheduled maintenances. On the other hand the high number of active 
critical MEL items is considered to be a risk factor. This includes active category A and B 
items as well as rectification interval expiry (RIE) items, which stand for MEL items not 
rectified within specified time period. 
  
 40 
Hierarchical model 
The figure below illustrates the hierarchical structure of the identified risk factors. The risk 
factors marked with (*) are intended to be specified using the model for aerodrome and 
landing site determination (see Figure 17). The complete Simulink model of this flight 
planning structure can be seen in Appendix 2. 
 
Figure 18. The hierarchical structure for the planned flight model. 
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4.2 Data Acquisition 
4.2.1 Domain Human Expert Experience 
Membership Functions 
This section covers steps 4-5 of the process flowchart (Figure 16) by first introducing the 
fuzzy inference system (FIS) interface and then defining the membership functions to each 
fuzzy inference controller. These definitions were made by consulting aviation experts in 
CAA Finland. 
The core of the modelling process is the Fuzzy Logic Designer developed for MATLAB
®
. The 
graphical user interface is illustrated in Figure 19. The main window enables defining the 
inputs and outputs as well as the fuzzy operators used in the calculation (refer to Section 3.2.2). 
It also provides access to the membership function and rule editors as well as to rule and 
output graph viewers. However, for effective and dynamic system modification, it is preferred 
to use text based .fis files in the initialisation of the fuzzy controller. This way the file can be 
loaded to the workspace as a structure variable, which can be modified dynamically during the 
execution of the risk analysis program. 
 
Figure 19. The graphical user interface of the Fuzzy Logic Designer. Source: MATLAB®. 
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Figure 20. The definition of the membership functions. Source: MATLAB®. 
The membership function editor (see Figure 20) enables defining the numerical boundaries for 
the fuzzy sets, which describe the state of the input variables in a linguistic manner. On the 
lowest hierarchy level of a risk model, the input variables of a fuzzy controller are parameters, 
which mostly are directly obtainable from actual operations. In Figure 20, for example, the 
values on the horizontal axis are hours and amount of sectors. In the definition of the input 
variable’s permissible range, one must take into account the applicable aviation regulations. 
For example, the maximum permissible number of duty hours for a pilot is 13 hours without 
the use of extensions and assuming 1-2 sectors in the duty period (ORO.FTL.205). In case 
there are no maximum permissible upper limit defined by the aviation regulations (e.g. flight 
experience), one must consider what the maximum reasonable number is in the context of the 
operation’s nature. 
In the definition of the membership functions for the fuzzy sets, triangular-shaped functions 
are preferred in this thesis. In addition, the boundaries for the functions are selected so that the 
next membership function starts at the position, where the maximum of the previous function 
lies. This enables a smooth and linear risk increment (or diminishment) as a function of the 
input variable. In case there is no linear relation between the risk increment and input variable, 
trapezoidal-shaped membership functions should be used instead. For example, there is no 
clear evidence that risk would increase when an aircraft model age is between 10 and 15 years. 
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Table 4 and Table 5 show the results of the input membership function definitions for the 
aerodrome and landing site determination model (Figure 17) and the flight planning model 
(Figure 18) respectively. The definitions are sorted so that the fuzzy sets being least risky are 
placed to the left side whereas the most risky fuzzy sets are placed to the right side. 
Some of the inputs have a continuous range and some are meant to be discrete. The continuous 
inputs have primarily an engineering unit, which unambiguously expresses the state of that 
input. However, the inputs with a discrete range do not have any unit and the user have to 
choose between the available alternatives. Often this information is obtainable, for example, 
from an aeronautical information platform (AIP) or airport flight information service (AFIS). 
If not, the value must be concluded by using other available means or rationale judgement. 
Table 4. The definition of the input membership functions for the aerodrome and landing site determination model. 
 Input code Unit Range Definition of the membership function 
A
e
ro
d
ro
m
e
 r
is
ks
 
light_systems - 1...5 FALS = 1, IALS = 2, BALS = 3, NALS = 4, no lights at all = 5 
appr_systems - 1...4 precision = 1, APV = 2, non-precision = 3, no IFR = 4 
circling_min ft 0-2 000 (height) normal < 1000, abnormal > 1000 
airport_elev ft 0-15 000 low < 5000, medium 5000-8000, high > 8000 
avg_weather - 1, 2 normal = 1, unpredictable weather, high temp etc. = 2 
obstructions ft 0-10 000 
(= MSA-aerodrome elevation) 
low < 3000, medium 3000-5000, high > 5000 
perf_limits - 1...4 
normal profile = 1, steep take-off profile (> 3.3%) = 2, 
steep approach profile (> 3°) = 3, both steep profiles = 4 
rwy_ratio - 0-1 
(= TORR/TORA or LDR/LDA) 
long < 0.5, medium 0.5-0.7, short > 0.7 
braking_act - 0-0.5 
good > 0.4, medium/good 0.39-0.36, medium 0.35-0.3, 
medium/poor 0.29-0.26, poor < 0.25 
La
n
d
in
g 
si
te
 r
is
ks
 obstacles ft 0-10 000 
(= approximated MSA-landing site elevation) 
low < 3000, medium 3000-5000, high > 5000 
gnd_surface - 1, 2, 3 asphalt = 1, flat gravel/grass = 2, rugged gravel/grass = 3 
elevation ft 0-15 000 low < 5000, medium 5000-8000, high > 8000 
length - 0-1 
(= LDR/LDA) 
long < 0.3, medium 0.3-0.7, short > 0.7 
width m 0-50 wide > 45, medium 20-45, narrow < 20 
slope º 0-10 normal < 2, abnormal 2-6, extreme > 6 
En
vi
ro
n
m
e
n
t 
ri
sk
s 
rvr - 0-5 
(= RVR actual/RVR required) 
good > 2, medium 2-1.5, bad < 1.5 
precipitation mm 0-15 light < 3, moderate 3-11, heavy > 11 
wnd_spd m/s 0-30 light < 5, gentle 5-10, moderate 10-14, strong > 14 
wnd_drctn º 0-180 head < 30, cross 30-150, tail > 150 
wnd_gust m/s 0-30 
(= gust-steady) 
low < 5,medium 5-15, high > 15 
light_cond - 1, 2, 3 day = 1, twilight = 2, night = 3 
icing - 1, 2, 3 low = 1, medium = 2, severe = 3 
 NOTE: The explanations for the input codes can be seen in Figure 17. 
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Table 5. The definition of the input membership functions for the flight planning model. 
 Input code Unit Range Definition of the membership function 
Se
ct
o
r 
ri
sk
s departure - - Acquired from the other risk model 
alternate - - Acquired from the other risk model 
risk_period % 0-100 low < 30, medium 30-70, high > 70 (0 for twin-engined) 
altitude ft 5 000-3 0000 high > 20000, medium 20000-10000, low < 10000 
arrival - - Acquired from the other risk model 
Fl
ig
h
t 
cr
e
w
 r
is
ks
 
cmndr_total fh 200-12 000 high > 4000, medium 4000-1500, low < 1500 
cmndr_type fh 12-3 000 high > 1000, medium 1000-300, low < 300 
cmndr_recent fh 0-300 high > 50, medium 50-20, low < 20 
copilot_total fh 200-6 000 high > 2000, medium 2000-700, low < 700 
copilot_type fh 12-3 000 high > 1000, medium 1000-300, low < 300 
copilot_recent fh 0-300 high > 40, medium 40-20, low < 20 
crm_perf - 1, 2, 3 efficient = 1, satisfactory = 2, inefficient = 3 
sop_perf - 1, 2, 3 efficient = 1, satisfactory = 2, inefficient = 3 
duty_hours h 0-13 little < 6, average 6-10, critical > 10 
previous_sctrs - 0-8 little < 2, medium 2-4, high > 4 
age_cmndr - 18-70 young < 50, middle 50-60, old > 60 
age_copilot - 18-70 young < 50, middle 50-60, old > 60 
oml_rstrctns - 1, 2 no = 1, yes = 2 
A
ir
cr
af
t 
ri
sk
s 
climb_grad % -20-20 good > 5, medium 5-(-8), bad < -8 
reverser - 1, 2 equipped = 1, not equipped = 2 
antiskid - 1, 2 equipped = 1, not equipped = 2 
eng_failure 10
-6
 1/fh 1-10 good < 2, medium 2-6, poor > 6 
prop_failure 10
-8
 1/fh 1-10 good < 5.5, poor > 5.5 
pres_failure 10
-8
 1/fh 1-10 good < 5.5, poor > 5.5 
power_failure 10
-8
 1/fh 1-10 good < 5.5, poor > 5.5 
model_age - 0-40 middle 10-30, new < 10, old > 30 
freq_unexp 10
-3
 1/fh 0-150 good < 25, medium 25-50, poor > 50 
num_cat_a - 0-5 good 0, satisfactory 1-2, bad > 3 
num_cat_b - 0-5 good 0, satisfactory 1-2, bad > 3 
num_rie - 0-5 good 0, satisfactory 1, bad > 2 
 NOTE: The explanations for the input codes can be seen in Figure 18. 
 
The membership functions of the continuous inputs are configured so that the function gets it 
maximum value at the center of the fuzzy set’s range if the both ends are closed. If the other 
end is open, the function gets the maximum value at the minimum or maximum of the input 
depending on which is applicable. However, in some instances, where trapezoidal-shaped 
membership functions are used, the function gets the maximum value already at the verge of 
the fuzzy set’s range. The membership functions of the discrete inputs in turn get their 
maximum at the point of the fuzzy set’s range. 
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Weights of the Risk Factors 
In this section, a closer look is taken to the step 7a in Figure 16. The priority weights were 
established by a pairwise comparison method introduced in Section 3.2.1. The data to the 
weight ratio matrices was collected by an online survey, which was sent to multiple aviation 
experts in CAA Finland, EASA and Hendell Aviation. In this survey, the linguistic scale 
shown in Table 6 was used in the process. 
Table 6. The linguistic scale used in the online survey. 
Column number Corresponding weight ratio Description 
-4 1/5 Absolutely less important 
-3 1/4 Very strongly less important 
-2 1/3 Strongly less important 
-1 1/2 Weakly less important 
0 1 Just equal 
1 2 Weakly more important 
2 3 Strongly more important 
3 4 Very strongly more important 
4 5 Absolutely more important 
 
A screenshot of the actual survey is presented in Figure 21. Both risk models were reviewed 
systematically by examining one branch at a time from top to bottom. The experts were asked 
to think how essential they considered the influence of a first risk factor compared to another 
risk factor. In other words, if they considered the first risk factor more important compared to 
the other and, hence, gave more ‘weight’ to it, then the value of that risk factor would have 
more ‘power’ to affect the output risk value of the whole risk model. 
A total of nine experts answered to the survey. The majority of them were inspectors and 
special advisers from CAA Finland but also one response from EASA and a couple responses 
from Hendell Aviation were received. Many of these experts were also professional pilots. 
The challenge in the filling the survey was being consistent with the answers. There were a 
total of 30 questions and 70 evaluations to be made, in which risk factors were compared on 
multiple different levels and contexts. It may have been difficult to always keep in mind in 
which order the risk factors were supposed to be compared and give the correct ‘weight’ 
accordingly. Furthermore, the answers are always strongly subjective to the opinion of each 
expert. These matters explain the relatively large standard deviation (76.7 %). With a larger 
number of participants, the deviation would probably have been smaller. However, for 
consistent and justified weight ratios, a single brainstorming event may have been a better 
alternative. 
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Figure 21. A screenshot of the online survey showing the first three questions. 
The answers of each aviation expert were combined using geometric average (equation (7)) to 
get representative weight ratios. These weight ratios were then inserted to an Excel (MS 
Office) sheet to form the weight ratio matrices. A custom MATLAB
®
 function, which is part 
of the risk assessment program, can then pick these matrices from the Excel sheet and 
dynamically calculate the final weight coefficients during the execution of the program. This 
is done with the eigenvector algorithm established in the equations (8) and (9). The function 
also scales the vector components so that the largest weight coefficient is one. 
The full weight ratio matrices of the aerodrome and landing site determination and flight 
planning risk models are presented in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively. The final 
weight coefficients are presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7. The priority weights of the risk factors in Figure 17 and Figure 18 respectively. 
Risk factor code Value  Risk factor code Value 
aerodrome_risk 0.3785  sector_risk 0.6608 
lnd_site_risk 1  flight_crew_risk 1 
environ_risk 0.5958  aircraft_risk 0.7434 
airport_cat 1  departure 0.7489 
rwy_cond_risk 0.7489  enroute_risk 0.3843 
properties 0.8195  arrival 1 
environ_spec 1  alternate 1 
perf_limits 0.8195  risk_period 0.9499 
light_systems 0.9002  altitude 0.6758 
appr_systems 1  pilot_error_risk 1 
circling_min 0.5482  incap_risk 0.3512 
airport_elev 0.6789  crew_exp_risk 0.6616 
avg_weather 1  crew_tr_risk 1 
obstructions 0.9895  fatig_risk 0.7132 
rwy_ratio 1  cmndr_exp_risk 1 
braking_act 0.8194  copilot_exp_risk 0.7169 
cond_risk 0.8194  cmndr_total 1 
dimen_risk 1  cmndr_type 1 
obstacles 1  cmndr_recent 0.9138 
gnd_surface 0.7434  copilot_total 0.8482 
elevation 0.4056  copilot_type 0.8664 
length 1  copilot_recent 1 
width 0.5971  crm_perf 1 
slope 0.6036  sop_perf 0.8851 
weather_risk 1  duty_hours 1 
light_cond 0.6339  previous_sctrs 0.9871 
icing 0.8795  age_cmndr 0.8890 
rvr 1  age_copilot 0.5918 
precipitation 0.5195  oml_rstrctns 1 
wind_risk 0.6672  ac_model_risk 0.7507 
wnd_spd 0.6505  ac_age_risk 0.4415 
wnd_drctn 1  mel_risk 1 
wnd_gust 0.8574  redund_risk 1 
   prop_rel_risk 0.8037 
   sys_rel_risk 0.9317 
   climb_grad 1 
   reverser 0.5734 
   antiskid 0.6125 
   eng_failure 1 
   prop_failure 0.5261 
   pres_failure 0.4175 
   power_failure 1 
   model_age 0.5576 
   freq_unexp 1 
   num_cat_a 1 
   num_cat_b 0.8160 
   num_rie 0.6964 
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4.2.2 Statistical Data and Information Analysis 
Most of the input membership functions’ definitions in Table 4 and Table 5 were derived 
using the consultation of aviation experts in CAA Finland. However, some of the definitions 
needed some further studying and analysing of statistics and applicable certification 
specifications. These are the propulsion and system failure rates as well as the frequency of 
unexpected failures in Table 5. The definition of their membership functions are reviewed 
more closely below. 
Propulsion and System Failure Rates 
The definitions for engine failure rate’s membership functions were derived using Robert E. 
Breiling Associates’ annual accident review 2012 for single turboprop powered aircraft [38], a 
report of Nall general aviation accidents in 2012 [39] and EASA’s rulemaking documents for 
SET-IMC [4] [6]. At this point, it must be mentioned that, for twin-engined aeroplanes, the 
same propulsion failure rate definitions are used. In this case, the failure rate applies to the 
situation, where one of the engines or propellers fails. The distinction to the single-engined 
aeroplanes emerges in the ‘climb gradient in OEI situation’ parameter. For single-engined 
aeroplanes it is equal to the power-off glide ratio (gradient < 0 %) whereas for twin-engined 
aeroplanes it is specific to the available thrust in OEI situation (gradient ≥ 0 %). 
The Breiling’s accident review [38] covers all the accidents occurred among U.S. and 
Canadian registered fleets throughout the aircraft introduction till 2012. The applicable data 
have been extracted to Table 8. 
Table 8. Accident data for various SET aeroplane models. [38] 
 CE-208 
TBM-700/ 
TBM-850 
PC-12 PA-46-500TP 
Fleet size 
(year end 2012) 
878 422 794 363 
Hours flown 8 445 005 734 072 2 958 834 575 456 
Accidents due power loss / 
mechanical malf / failure 
20 2 4 2 
Power loss accident rate per 
flight hour 
2.4∙10-6 2.7∙10-6 1.4∙10-6 3.5∙10-6 
Power loss fatal accident 
rate per flight hour 
0.12∙10-6 0 0 0 
 
The Nall report [39] in turn reveals that in 2012 in total 72 power loss accidents occurred to 
non-commercial fixed-wing aeroplanes registered to U.S. Nine of these were fatal. Over the 
same time frame, the aeroplanes have flown about 17 768 000 hours. This data results to total 
and fatal power loss rates of 4.05∙10-6 1/fh and 0.51∙10-6 1/fh, respectively. These numbers 
include all the aeroplane models and engine types. 
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In comparison, EASA has established in its SET-IMC rulemaking process [4] [6] a safety 
target of 1.3∙10-6 1/fh for a fatal accident rate following an engine failure. As a base the agency 
has used an engine reliability rate of 10 occurrences per million flight hours, which is equal to 
1∙10-5 1/fh. Compared to the actual failure rates presented above, this value is too large 
although the fatal/total accident ratio is fairly realistic (0.51/4.05 versus 1.3/10). To make the 
risk assessment in this thesis to correspond with the reality, it was therefore decided to use a 
value 4∙10-6 1/fh as a base, which results to a fuzzy set ‘medium’. The whole definition was 
then configured to be: good < 2∙10-6 1/fh, medium 2-6∙10-6 1/fh, poor > 6∙10-6 1/fh in a range 
of 1∙10-6-1∙10-5 1/fh as in Table 5. 
Regarding the definitions for propeller failure rate membership functions, EASA’s 
certification specifications for propellers [40] were used as no publicly available studies were 
found about accidents caused by a propeller failure. These specifications establish a 
requirement that hazardous propeller effects are not allowed to occur at a rate in excess of that 
defined as extremely remote (CS-P 150). The definition for this is that the probability of 
occurrence is 1∙10-7 occurrences or less per propeller flight hour. It is also mentioned that this 
requirement can be complied if it can be predicted that a failure of any of the individual 
components within the propeller system is more remote than 1∙10-8 1/fh. As a result, it was 
decided to use a linear scaling between these two values and therefore the definition became: 
good < 5.5∙10-8 1/fh, poor > 5.5∙10-8 1/fh in a range of 1∙10-8-1∙10-7 1/fh as in Table 5. 
The system reliability risk definitions were likewise configured using applicable CS-23 
certification specifications [41]. As the pressurisation and electrical power systems can be 
classified as system components, of which failure would significantly reduce (but not 
necessary prevent) the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with 
adverse operating conditions, the failure probability must be improbable (CS 23.1309). This is 
equivalent with the term ‘extremely remote’ and thus the numeric definition is 1∙10-7 
occurrences per flight hour. Therefore, it was decided to use same definitions for 
pressurisation and electrical power systems as for the propeller. 
The input values for the failure rates should be acquired from the applicable system 
manufacturer, who has a responsibility to monitor the reliability of its products. However, the 
author of this thesis was unable to get this data from Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. when inquired. For 
this reason, only enlightened risk estimates are used in this thesis. In a further development 
phase of this risk analysis technique, more accurate and model specific failure rates should be 
used. 
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Frequency of Unexpected Failures 
The definitions for the membership functions of the frequency of unexpected failures were 
defined using the actual operational data of Hendell Aviation. At the moment of the study, the 
fleet of Hendell Aviation consisted of two Pilatus PC-12/47E single-engined turbine 
aeroplanes. The definition for the frequency of unexpected failures is that the failures have 
occurred unexpectedly in between the maintenance intervals and are discovered by a pilot 
during a flight operation. 
A brief study revealed that the frequencies were lying in range of 0-104.1∙10-3 1/fh when the 
operational data of the last three years were studied. The three-year average for the first 
aeroplane was 50.0∙10-3 1/fh whereas for the other it was 22.5∙10-3 1/fh. Based on the flight 
hours, the weighted average of these values was then 37.1∙10-3 1/fh. 
The study revealed that there was a lot of discrepancy with the results for different years but 
the results were systematically higher for the other aeroplane although the models were same. 
It can be therefore concluded that the frequency is distinctly dependent on the individual 
factors of the aeroplane and the same number does not apply to all aeroplanes of the same 
model. 
Although this brief study was not extensive, it still gave some insight for establishing 
applicable ranges for the frequency. Also some feedback was received from another European 
SET operator Voldirect Ltd. that they have had roughly the same amount of failures with their 
Pilatus PC-12 and Socata TBM-850 fleets. However, they were not able to provide exact 
operational data so that frequencies were not calculated. As a result, the definition for the 
membership functions was configured to be: good < 25∙10-3 1/fh, medium 25-50∙10-3 1/fh, 
poor > 50∙10-3 1/fh in a range of 0-150∙10-3 1/fh as in Table 5. Nonetheless, this definition 
should be revised with more extensive data in case this fuzzy evaluation method will be 
developed in future. 
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4.3 Establishing Fuzzy Rule Base 
The fuzzy rule base was established by a linear regression algorithm as presented in the 
equation (24). This is the sixth step of the process flowchart in Figure 16. For this process, the 
membership functions of the consequents must first be determined. It was decided to use range 
of 1-10 for the output values and this range was divided to 37 membership functions. However, 
as it was decided to use Sugeno system in the assessment, these functions are only plain 
numbers. Therefore, the equivalent output membership values are 1, 1.25, 1.5, …, 9.75, 10. 
The reason for such a high number of membership functions is that this way a better resolution 
is achieved and less rounding must be made to the nearest possible integer. 
The rules can then be derived using the priority weights in Table 7 by multiplying each fuzzy 
set index with the applicable priority weight. However, the index must also be divided with 
the number of each input’s fuzzy sets because otherwise the inputs with a high number of 
fuzzy sets would artificially have more weight to the output value. Number one must be 
subtracted from both the nominator and denominator to make the scaling behave correctly and 
for that reason also the priority weight must be multiplied with number ten so that the 
nominator would stay positive. A usage example of the equation (24) is illustrated in Table 9 
and the corresponding screenshot of the rule editor is presented in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. The definition of the fuzzy rule base. Source: MATLAB®. 
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Table 9. A usage example of the equation (24) for the fatigue risk fuzzy controller. 
 Duty 
hours 
  Previous 
sectors 
 Duty hours 
(weighted)* 
Previous sectors 
(weighted)** 
Sum 
  Fatigue 
risk*** 
IF
 
1  
A
N
D
 
1  1.00 1.00 2.00  
TH
EN
 
1 
1  2  1.00 5.44 6.44  10 
1  3  1.00 9.87 10.87  19 
2  1  5.50 1.00 6.50  10 
2  2  5.50 5.44 10.94  19 
2  3  5.50 9.87 15.37  28 
3  1  10.00 1.00 11.00  19 
3  2  10.00 5.44 15.44  28 
3  3  10.00 9.87 19.87  37 
* Calculated with the formula (1 + (1∙10 - 1)/(3 - 1))∙(Aj1 - 1)) 
** Calculated with the formula (1 + (0.9871∙10 - 1)/(3 - 1))∙(Aj2 - 1)) 
*** Calculated with the formula ((37 - 1)/(19.87 - 2.00)∙(Sumj - 2.00) + 1) 
 
In the risk assessment program, this algorithm was implemented as two separate functions. 
The one function first loads the preprogrammed configuration files (.fis) to the dynamic 
workspace. The configuration file for each fuzzy controller includes information about all the 
inputs and outputs, their corresponding ranges and membership functions as well as the 
number of required rules. However, they are still missing all the consequents in the rules. 
These are added dynamically to the workspace structure variables during the execution of the 
program by using the other function. This function basically does the same job as presented in 
Table 9. The required priority weights are acquired from the function, which handles the 
eigenvector algorithm. The graphical rule editor in Figure 22 is not needed in the process as all 
the work is performed on the code level. However, it can be still used to monitor and validate 
the proper operation of the functions. 
It must also be reminded that the rule weights, which are visible in Figure 22, were not used in 
this algorithm. Basically these weights would scale the effect of the whole rule whereas the 
priority weights in this assessment affect only to the applicable input of the rule. This way the 
importance weights of the inputs can be logically directed to the output results of each fuzzy 
controller. Further validation aspects of this method are presented in Section 5.1. 
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4.4 Risk Modelling Results 
This section introduces some example modelling results using three different hypothetical 
flight operations, which represent distinct operation classes by their complexity. These are a 
flight over a highly populated area using major airports as a departure and arrival points, a 
flight over a congested region using small aerodromes and a flight over an ocean using 
challenging category C aerodromes. Each assessment is carried out for two different flight 
crew configurations (low risk and high risk) and three different aeroplane types (twin-engined 
reciprocating, single-engined turboprop and twin-engined turboprop). The process consists of 
choosing applicable input values for the assessment (step 7b of Figure 16) and then calculating 
the results (i.e. step 8 of Figure 16). The hypothetical configurations for the flight crew and 
airplane are presented in Table 10. The performance related aeroplane parameters have been 
derived using estimates of aviation experts. 
Table 10. The flight crew and aeroplane configurations used in the example modelling. 
Risk factor 
code 
Flight 
crew 1 
Flight 
crew 2 
 
Risk factor 
code 
Twin 
reciprocating 
Single 
turboprop 
Twin 
turboprop 
cmndr_total 6000 h 1000 h  climb_grad 0 % -6.25 % +8.0 % 
cmndr_type 1500 h 100 h  reverser 2 1 1 
cmndr_recent 120 h 30 h  antiskid 2 1 1 
copilot_total 2200 h 550 h  eng_failure 7.2∙10-6 1.4∙10-6 2.5∙10-6 
copilot_type 150 h 20 h  prop_failure 9∙10-8 4∙10-8 4∙10-8 
copilot_recent 80 h 10 h  pres_failure 8∙10-8 5∙10-8 1∙10-8 
crm_perf 1 3  power_failure 8∙10-8 2∙10-8 1∙10-8 
sop_perf 1 3  model_age 45 8 20 
duty_hours 4 12  freq_unexp 8∙10-3 37∙10-3 15∙10-3 
previous_sctrs 0 4  num_cat_a 0 0 1 
age_cmndr 56 35  num_cat_b 1 2 0 
age_copilot 30 25  num_rie 0 0 1 
oml_rstrctns 1 2      
4.4.1 Scenario 1 
The first scenario is a flight from Munich Airport (EDDM) to Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport 
(LFPG) in the daytime and varying weather conditions. No alternate aerodromes are needed 
for twin-engined aeroplanes as the flight time is only about 2.1 hours and there are multiple 
runways available at the departure and arrival (CAT.OP.MPA.180) but for the single-engined 
aeroplane one additional en-route alternate is needed and it is chosen to be Frankfurt Airport 
(EDDF). The flight level is chosen to be FL260 for all the cases. For the single-engined 
aeroplane, the risk period consists of only the take-off phase from 0 ft to 1 000 ft above 
ground level. This is assumed to take about one minute, which yields a risk period of 0.79 %. 
For the twin-engined aeroplanes, the risk period is not applicable and therefore it is zero for 
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them. All the sector and environment related parameters regarding this scenario are presented 
in Table 11. 
Table 11. The sector and environment related parameters and their corresponding risk level for the scenario 1. 
Risk factor code EDDM LFPG EDDF* 
light_systems 1 1 1 
appr_systems 1 1 1 
circling_min N/A 600 ft N/A 
airport_elev 1487 ft 392 ft 364 ft 
avg_weather 1 1 1 
obstructions 2213 ft 2108 ft 3936 ft 
perf_limits 1 1 1 
rwy_ratio 0.17 0.24 0.17 
braking_act 0.42 0.32 0.37 
rvr 2.5 1.5 1.8 
precipitation 0 mm 8 mm 2 mm 
wnd_spd 4 m/s 14 m/s 8 m/s 
wnd_drctn 25º 30º 110º 
wnd_gust 3 m/s 9 m/s 5 m/s 
light_cond 1 1 1 
icing 1 1 1 
RISK LEVEL 1.37 1.79 1.58 
* Applies only to single-engined aeroplanes 
 
As seen in Table 11, worse weather conditions have a noticeable effect on the risk level when 
comparing EDDM and LFPG. However, the most undesirable wind direction with the 
combination of highest obstruction level (minimum sector height (MSH)) raises the risk level 
of EDDF close to the risk level of LFPG although the weather conditions are not as bad for 
EDDF. The risk levels for the whole flight can be seen in Table 12. 
Table 12. The risk levels for the planned flight of the scenario 1 with different flight crew and aeroplane configurations. 
 Twin reciprocating Single turboprop Twin turboprop 
Flight crew 1 2.92 2.49 2.39 
Flight crew 2 5.29 4.86 4.76 
 
Table 12 shows that the reciprocating aeroplane results to the highest risk level although it has 
two engines. The difference between the twin-engined reciprocating and single-engined 
turboprop aeroplanes is far greater than the difference between the single-engined turboprop 
and twin-engined turboprop aeroplanes. In percent, the risk increase between the safest and 
riskiest aeroplane type is up to 18.2 % whereas the risk increase between the low risk and high 
risk flight crews is up to 49.8 %. Therefore, it can be concluded that the flight crew has far 
more contribution to the total risk level of a flight than the aeroplane itself. 
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4.4.2 Scenario 2 
The second scenario is a flight from Gällivare Airport (ESNG) to Kirkenes Airport (ENKR) in 
the daytime and in severe icing conditions. The approximated flight time is 1.5 hours with the 
flight level FL260. In this scenario, the departure aerodrome is chosen to be also the 
destination alternate. For the single-engined aeroplane, the en-route alternate is Kaamanen 
Airfield at 69.125º N 27.235º E. To be more precise, for example Enontekiö Airport (EFET) 
would have been a better alternate as it has runway lighting and IFR equipment but Kaamanen 
Airfield was chosen to see the effect of a landing site as an alternate to the overall risk level. 
Again, the risk period for single-engined aeroplane consists of only the take-off phase from 0 
ft to 1 000 ft above ground level so this yields to risk period of 1.11 % by using the one minute 
assumption. All the sector and environment related parameters regarding this scenario are 
presented in Table 13. The minimum sector height for the Kaamanen Airfield has been 
approximated using an online map service. 
Table 13. The sector and environment related parameters and their corresponding risk level for the scenario 2. 
Risk factor code ESNG ENKR Kaaman.* 
light_systems 1 1 - 
appr_systems 1 1 - 
circling_min 720 ft 798 ft - 
airport_elev 1027 ft 282 ft - 
avg_weather 1 1 - 
obstructions 2973 ft 2918 ft - 
perf_limits 1 4 - 
rwy_ratio 0.39 0.31 - 
braking_act 0.23 0.27 - 
obstacles - - 1978 ft 
gnd_surface - - 2 
elevation - - 498 ft 
length - - 0.41 
width - - 30 m 
slope - - 0º 
rvr 3.7 3.0 3.5 
precipitation 0 mm 0 mm 0 mm 
wnd_spd 7 m/s 5 m/s 8 m/s 
wnd_drctn 25º 10º 50º 
wnd_gust 2 m/s 4 m/s 3 m/s 
light_cond 1 1 1 
icing 3 3 3 
RISK LEVEL 2.47 2.74 5.16 
* Applies only to single-engined aeroplanes 
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It can be seen that the risk levels for the aerodromes of the scenario 2 (Table 13) are much 
higher than for the aerodromes of the scenario 1 (Table 11). This is largely caused by the 
severe icing, shorter runways and worse braking actions. The significantly higher risk level for 
the Kaamanen Airfield comes from the conservative assumption made in this thesis that a 
landing site is always riskier than an aerodrome because there’s no approach or landing charts 
published for the landing sites and their properties are not validated, i.e. it is not 100 % 
confident that the landing site is exactly what is anticipated. For that reason the system is 
configured so that, without taking into account the environmental aspects, the minimum risk 
level of a landing site is the maximum risk level of an aerodrome. The risk levels for the 
whole flight can be seen in Table 14. 
Table 14. The risk levels for the planned flight of the scenario 2 with different flight crew and aeroplane configurations. 
 Twin reciprocating Single turboprop Twin turboprop 
Flight crew 1 3.15 2.76 2.63 
Flight crew 2 5.55 5.14 5.01 
 
Although the risk levels for the departure and arrival aerodromes have increased up to 40 % 
for the scenario 2 compared to the scenario 1, the risk levels for the whole flight as in Table 14 
have increased only about 6 % because the flight crew and aeroplane configurations have still 
remained the same. This is a rational outcome as the sector based risks constitute only a part of 
the total risk. Noticeable is also an observation that the flight with the single-engined 
turboprop aeroplane is still considerably safer than the flight with twin-engined reciprocating 
aeroplane although a landing site was used as an en-route alternate instead of an aerodrome. 
4.4.3 Scenario 3 
The third scenario is a flight from Gibraltar Airport (LXGB) to Ajaccio Napoleon Bonaparte 
Airport (LFKJ) at night and in a severe crosswind. The total flight time is about 3.0 hours with 
the same flight level FL260. The Ibiza Airport (LEIB) and Menorca Airport (LEMH) act in 
this case as en-route alternates for the single-engined aeroplane. LEMH is also chosen to be 
the destination alternate. This time the risk period consists of both the take-off phase from 0 ft 
to 1 000 ft above ground level (approximately one minute) and also the en-route phases, where 
the aeroplane is over 34 minutes away from an aerodrome (refer to Figure 1). In this case, the 
en-route risk period flight covers roughly 8 minutes. So, in total, the risk period is about 9 
minutes of the flight duration of 240 minutes. As a result, this yields to risk period percentage 
of 3.75 %. For comparison, the calculation was repeated for the flight by using only LEMH as 
an en-route alternate. In this case the total risk period would be 40 minutes, which yields to 
risk period percentage of 16.67 %. All the sector and environment related parameters 
regarding this scenario are presented in Table 15. 
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Table 15. The sector and environment related parameters and their corresponding risk level for the scenario 3. 
Risk factor code LXGB LFKJ LEIB* LEMH 
light_systems 4 4 1 1 
appr_systems 3 1 1 1 
circling_min N/A 1100 ft 970 ft 440 ft 
airport_elev 12 ft 19 ft 24 ft 302 ft 
avg_weather 2 2 1 1 
obstructions 6788 ft 10681 ft 2776 ft 2198 ft 
perf_limits 1 1 1 1 
rwy_ratio 0.38 0.27 0.24 0.31 
braking_act 0.45 0.41 0.46 0.47 
rvr 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.5 
precipitation 0 mm 0 mm 0 mm 0 mm 
wnd_spd 15 m/s 16 m/s 14 m/s 13 m/s 
wnd_drctn 35º 40º 45º 50º 
wnd_gust 4 m/s 2 m/s 5 m/s 5 m/s 
light_cond 3 3 3 3 
icing 1 1 1 1 
RISK LEVEL 2.39 2.27 2.07 2.07 
* Applies only to single-engined aeroplanes 
 
Compared to the aerodromes of the scenario 2 (Table 13), the risk levels of LXGB and LFKJ 
(Table 15) are close to the values of ESNG and ENKR. The values of the former are a bit 
lower because the prevailing lighting conditions have been considered less relevant for the 
combined risk than icing conditions (see Table 7). Furthermore, for example better braking 
action and lower airport elevation affect positively to the outcome and seem to partly override 
worse MSH, RVR and wind conditions. The risk levels for the whole flight can be seen in 
Table 16. The values in parentheses are for the case of only one en-route alternate along the 
route (applies to single-engined turboprops). 
Table 16. The risk levels for the planned flight of the scenario 3 with different flight crew and aeroplane configurations. 
 Twin reciprocating Single turboprop Twin turboprop 
Flight crew 1 3.08 2.65 (2.67) 2.56 
Flight crew 2 5.47 5.02 (5.04) 4.93 
 
The overall results for the scenario 3 as in Table 16 seem also be in the same range with the 
scenario 2 results (Table 14). Noticeable is an observation for the case of the single-engined 
aeroplane that dropping out one en-route alternate and replacing it with additional risk period 
(3.75 % → 16.67 %) has very limited impact to the overall risk. However, by going down the 
risk hierarchy and examining the output values of the en-route risk node alone reveals that the 
en-route risk increases up to 20.3 % when the risk period is increased from 3.75 % to 16.67 %. 
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However, the en-route risk does not affect that much the top level value as both en-route and 
sector risks are ranked as the least important risk factors in the relevant classes (see Table 7). 
4.4.4 Analysis of Risk Modelling 
Based on the example modelling, an important conclusion was that the twin-engined 
reciprocating aeroplane was considered the riskiest by the model as it usually presents an older 
generation with less safe aeroplane systems. The single and twin-engined turboprop 
aeroplanes on the other hand were ranked close to each other with only a slight advance for 
the twin-engined turboprop. However, the used failure rates were mostly rough estimates as no 
model specific data of each system were available at that moment. Still the results are giving 
some good direction that single-engined turboprops are almost as safe as twin-engined 
turboprops and therefore overregulating their operation is inappropriate. Instead, the flight 
crew related risks were shown to present a considerably stronger role in the combined risk 
level and, therefore, more emphasis should be given for the development of the flight crew’s 
training. 
A closer study of the individual input parameters’ behaviour reveals that the effectiveness of 
the parameter depends on not only its individual weight but also its position in the hierarchy. 
Therefore, for example commander’s age has a stronger influence than commander’s total 
flight hours although the incapacitation risk was weighted significantly less important than the 
pilot error risk. The reason for this is that the incapacitation risk was modelled to comprise of 
only three input parameters whereas the pilot error risk comprises of ten input parameters. 
Therefore, the commander’s age has a larger relative fraction to the incapacitation risk value 
than what the commander’s flight hours have to the pilot error risk value. In reality, more 
parameters are believed to affect the incapacitation risk and for that reason the age of the pilots 
may have too much influence to the output in this model in reality. It must be noted that the 
input parameters are rarely totally independent of each other. For example, when a pilot gains 
age, he concurrently gains more flight experience so the drawbacks of the ageing are often 
outdone by the increased flight experience. 
The technical difficulty of the risk analysis was that the number of nodes on each level was 
practically limited to a maximum of three as otherwise the number of required rules in the rule 
base would increase exponentially. Therefore, if more than three child nodes are describing a 
parent node, an intermediate node is needed to combine some of the child nodes so that the 
number of nodes on each level remains three or under. This, however, complicates the 
weighting process and there is a risk that the weights of the child nodes, which were combined 
with the intermediate node, are underestimated. To ensure that the rearrangement would not 
have effect to the results, the relative weight of the intermediate node should equal to the sum 
of its child nodes’ weights when all the child nodes are pairwise compared between each other. 
 
 59 
5 Evaluation and Validation of Risk Model Results 
This section addresses the final step 9 of the process flowchart in Figure 16, that is, the 
validation of the risk assessment results. This consists of: 
1. Determining the rationality and conformity of the model results, and 
2. Verifying the acceptability of the results by comparing the values to predetermined 
safety targets. 
5.1 Rationalisation of the Method 
The rule viewer of MATLAB
®
 enables a straightforward validation of each fuzzy logic block. 
For example, Figure 23 shows the rule viewer for the flight crew risk node in an event, where 
the pilot error risk is 2.8 and the incapacitation risk is 3.5. 
 
Figure 23. The rule viewer. Source: MATLAB®. 
The columns in the rule viewer represent all the inputs and the output. Likewise, each row 
represents one of the rules and the corresponding membership functions of the fuzzy sets in 
that rule. The vertical red lines show how the input values settle to their corresponding ranges 
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and how much truth they have in each rule. The truths of the consequents are calculated with 
the product of the antecedents’ truth values. Finally the consequents are combined by 
calculating the weighted average of all the consequents, where the weights are in this case the 
truth values of the consequents. The mathematical equations for the membership function in 
Figure 23 are presented below: 
 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑥𝑖) = {
0,
𝑥𝑖,
(5.5 − 𝑥𝑖)/4.5,
0
  
𝑥𝑖 ≤ 0
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1
1 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 5.5
𝑥𝑖 ≥ 5.5
, (26) 
 
𝜇𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚(𝑥𝑖) = {
0,
(𝑥𝑖 − 1)/4.5,
(10 − 𝑥𝑖)/4.5,
0
  
𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1
1 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 5.5
5.5 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 10
𝑥𝑖 ≥ 10
, 
(27) 
 
𝜇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑥𝑖) = {
0,
(𝑥𝑖 − 5.5)/4.5,
(11 − 𝑥𝑖),
0
  
𝑥𝑖 ≤ 5.5
5.5 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 10
10 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 11
𝑥𝑖 ≥ 11
. 
(28) 
By using the above equations, the truth values, i.e. the firing strengths of each of the 
antecedents can be calculated. The calculation process conducted in Figure 23 is reproduced in 
Table 17, which shows all the steps numerically. The truth values of each antecedent and 
consequent are shown in the parentheses. 
Table 17. The calculation process of the fuzzy logic system for the flight crew risk node. 
IF x1 = 2.8 AND x2 = 3.5  
low (0.600) low (0.444) 1 (0.266) 
low (0.600) medium (0.556) 2 (0.334) 
low (0.600) high (0.000) 3 (0.000) 
medium (0.400) low (0.444) 4.5 (0.178) 
medium (0.400) medium (0.556) 5.5 (0.222) 
medium (0.400) high (0.000) 6.5 (0.000) 
high (0.000) low (0.444) 8 (0.000) 
high (0.000) medium (0.556) 9 (0.000) 
high (0.000) high (0.000) 10 (0.000) 
  THEN y = 2.956 
 
The THEN parts in the rule base were determined by using the equation (24) on page 32. In 
this equation, the pairwise comparison results (Table 7 on page 47) were used in order to get 
the results to behave realistically with the experts’ opinions. In the graphs of Figure 24, the 
effect of input weighting to the output results can be clearly seen when the same case is 
compared without and with the weighting. 
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Figure 24. The effect of input weighting on flight crew risk (left without the weighting and right with the weighting). 
In the left graph of Figure 24, equal priority weights of 1 and 1 are used for the pilot error and 
incapacitation risks respectively. For that reason the both edges of the surface graphs are on 
equal height. This means that the output risk rises to the same level regardless whether the 
pilot error risk is in its maximum and the incapacitation risk is in its minimum or vice versa. 
Therefore, both risk factors have a same weight to the flight crew risk level. 
However, in the right graph, priority weights of 1 and 0.3512 are used for the pilot error and 
incapacitation risk respectively (refer to Table 7 on page 47). This results to a situation that the 
plane of total flight crew risk is tilted strongly to the left. In this case incapacitation risk has 
far less power to affect to the flight crew risk compared to the pilot error risk. This is 
consistent with the experts’ opinions, which were received via the online survey. 
In overall, multiple fuzzy logic blocks similar to the flight crew risk (Figure 23) were linked to 
each other hierarchically as in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. Therefore, an output of one block 
is the input of the other block upper in the risk hierarchy. Each of these blocks has its own set 
of priority weights established so the outputs of all the fuzzy logic blocks should be rational. 
As a result, a single output value can be calculated for the whole planned flight with certain 
departure, alternate and arrival aerodromes. Still the appropriateness of the results should be 
carefully checked by experts especially in the early validation phase of the method. The 
hierarchical structures for the models are likely not fully extensive and they do not identify all 
the possible risk factors and their causal relationships. In the further validation of this 
analysing technique, these hierarchies should therefore be amended as necessary. Also the 
definition of the membership functions and priority weights should be revised when more 
extensive background data is available for utilisation. 
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5.2 Means to Establish the Safety Limits 
5.2.1 Determination of the Airport Category 
For the aerodromes of the scenarios 1-3 in Section 4.4, the risk values of the airport category, 
as in Table 18, were extracted from the developed system. 
Table 18. The extracted risk values of the airport category for the aerodromes of the scenarios 1-3. 
 Risk value   Risk value   Risk value 
EDDM 1.47  ESNG 1.79  LXGB 4.68 
LFPG 1.57  ENKR 4.53  LFKJ 4.63 
EDDF 1.69     LEIB 1.78 
      LEMH 1.53 
 
The values in Table 18 are different to the results in Table 11, Table 13 and Table 15 as the 
output of the airport category node is just an intermediate value in the risk model. Only the 
first seven inputs affect to the risk value of the airport category as seen in Figure 17 on page 
37. Therefore, neither the runway condition risks nor environment risks have effect on the 
definition of the airport category (risk). 
It was already known in advance, based on the national AIPs of the airports, that Kirkenes 
Airport (ENKR) must be dealt as a category B airport and Gibraltar Airport (LXGB) as well as 
Ajaccio Napoleon Bonaparte Airport (LFKJ) must be dealt as category C airports. The risk 
values in Table 18 for these airports can be seen to be considerably higher compared to the 
values of the other airports. Therefore, the results given by the airport category submodel seem 
to agree with the reality (AIPs). 
However, the distinction between the risk values of the above mentioned three airports is not 
great. It can be thereby concluded that they are verging the border between the category B and 
C airports. Of course more assessments should be made for a larger variety of airports to get a 
stronger reference. Based on the data here, the definition for the category C airport is set to be 
a risk value equal to or larger than 4.60. 
The definition for the category B airport is somewhat more challenging to be established as in 
the above data, only one category B airport exists. Anyhow, all the remaining airports, many 
of which are large European airports (with a capability to precise category II approaches), 
have a risk level lower than 2.0 so they can be depicted as category A airports with a good 
confidence. The definition for the category B airport is thereby set to be equal to or larger than 
2.0. It must be noted that this airport category determination submodel is probably not fully 
compliant with the existing EASA airport categorisation criteria, yet it is, evidently, a better 
tool to understand the whole picture instead of just making the determination based on only 
one critical parameter. 
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5.2.2 Definition of the Acceptance Criteria for the Risk Levels 
An essential step, after receiving an output risk level for a planned flight, is the comparison of 
the results with the criteria, which define the safety limits for flight operations. However, there 
exist no unambiguous criteria that could readily be set to be applicable. EASA’s regulations 
establish limitations for a few risk factors, which restrain the risk level to some extent, but 
they are not sufficient enough to establish uniform risk level limits. Moreover, different 
operators fly different nature of operations and, therefore, the mean risk level for each operator 
often varies. 
For the above reasons, it is more reasonable to examine typical risk values for a couple of 
operators conducting various different operation types and establish the safety limit based on 
the data. In this case, the risk level can be considered unacceptable if it differs ‘enough’ from 
the representative average value. To establish this average value, a longer-term validation 
phase should be conducted to calculate a risk value for a representative sample of flights over 
certain time period and check whether normal distribution is a good model of variation 
between operators. A mean risk value and standard deviation should then be calculated based 
on the distribution of the results. A sample size as large as practically possible should be used 
to mitigate the standard error. Then the safety limit can be set to a point, which differs from 
the mean distribution with a 0.01 confidence level. This means that 99 % of all the flights have 
a risk value lower than this threshold value. However, a risk value of 5.5 (middle point of the 
output range) should not be exceeded in any case regardless of the mean value. This is also 
supported by the analysis result here that the value of 5.5 is near the ultimate maximum risk 
value (of the scenarios in Section 4.4). 
In addition to the risk values of the planned flight, the risk values of the departure, arrival and 
alternate points should also be checked individually so that they are not too excessive. If the 
prevailing weather conditions for some aerodrome or landing site are too poor to be coped 
with by taking into account the individual properties of that aerodrome or landing site, then 
this aerodrome or landing site can be considered too dangerous to be operated. In this case, an 
excessive risk cannot be compensated by low risk values of the flight crew and aircraft 
branches. The establishment of the safety limits for the aerodromes and landing sites should be 
implemented using the same principles as described above for the planned flight. Mean values 
and standard deviations should be established for a group of typical aerodromes and typical 
landing sites respectively and if the risk value for some aerodrome or landing site exceeds 
significantly the mean distribution, e.g. with a 0.01 confidence level, then another operating 
point should be chosen. 
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In overall, the following steps should be conducted to determine the acceptability of a planned 
flight: 
1. Ensure that all the flight parameters are within the limitations of Airplane Flight 
Manual and EASA’s regulations. 
2. Compare the calculated risk level of the planned flight with the safety limit. Make sure 
that the value remains under the limit. 
3. Check that all published aerodrome and airspace minimums are complied. 
4. Check that the risk level of each aerodrome (and landing site if used) does not exceed 
the applicable safety limit. 
5. If any of the calculated risk value is over the limit, look for possible means to mitigate 
the risk. See section 6. 
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6 Risk Mitigation Measures 
In case that any of the risk assessment results are considered excessive, some mitigation 
actions must be conducted in order to get the assessment results remain within acceptable 
limits. This is done by modifying the layout of the flight so that the values of certain 
parameters move to a more favourable direction. However, many of the individual parameters 
are not directly controllable by an operator. For example, the risk factors forming a risk level 
for an aerodrome cannot be ‘altered’ without changing the runway or entire location. 
When it is concluded, based on the results, that risk mitigation is needed, the challenging issue 
is to determine which risk factors should be ‘modified’ by changes in operation to reach the 
safety target. Figure 25 shows for example the effect of cruise altitude and risk period to the 
overall risk level in the case of the scenario 3 for a single-engined aeroplane (in Section 4.4.3). 
The graphs are produced by changing the applicable parameter while leaving the other 
parameters untouched and then recalculating the result. The vertical axis shows the change of 
the risk level when the risk factor is shifted from a low risk to high risk level. The nonlinear 
shape of the cruise altitude curve comes from the definition of the membership functions; the 
risk level is more sensitive to altitude changes at low flight levels as most weather phenomena 
affect at low altitudes (higher probability). The slope of the risk period curve is considered to 
be constant instead. 
 
Figure 25. The effect of the cruise altitude and risk period to the overall risk level of the planned flight. 
The total impact of the cruise altitude and risk period to the overall risk level is rather limited 
as shown in Figure 25. The influence of an individual risk factor on the overall risk level 
depends on how much weight has been given to the risk factor and in which level in the 
hierarchy the risk factor lies. The leaves up in the hierarchy have primarily strong influence as 
their local effects are not split so many times in subsequent fuzzy logic blocks. Table 19 
shows the total influence of each individual risk factor to the overall risk. 
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Table 19. The total influence of each individual risk factor to the overall risk. 
Input code Influence  Input code Influence 
length 1.3117  crm_perf 0.7298 
obstacles 1.1111  sop_perf 0.6529 
icing 0.9028  num_cat_a 0.6250 
gnd_surface 0.8025  num_cat_b 0.5000 
slope 0.7716  duty_hours 0.4321 
width 0.6944  previous_sctrs 0.4321 
light_cond 0.6250  num_rie 0.4167 
rvr 0.4591  oml_rstrctns 0.3704 
elevation 0.3704  freq_unexp 0.3333 
rwy_ratio 0.3657  age_cmndr 0.3210 
braking_act 0.2963  power_failure 0.2500 
perf_limits 0.2546  age_copilot 0.1975 
precipitation 0.2160  eng_failure 0.1852 
avg_weather 0.1260  climb_grad 0.1836 
obstructions 0.1260  cmndr_total 0.1760 
appr_systems 0.1157  cmndr_type 0.1760 
wnd_drctn 0.1125  model_age 0.1667 
light_systems 0.1003  cmndr_recent 0.1614 
wnd_gust 0.0900  risk_period 0.1505 
airport_elev 0.0810  copilot_recent 0.1214 
wnd_spd 0.0675  antiskid 0.1080 
circling_min 0.0617  altitude 0.1042 
   copilot_total 0.1027 
   copilot_type 0.1027 
   reverser 0.0972 
   prop_failure 0.0926 
   pres_failure 0.0833 
 
The left side tabulation in Table 19 shows the influence of a risk factor on the aerodrome and 
landing site determination model and the right side tabulation the influence on the flight 
planning model. The influence of each individual risk factor is calculated by first setting all 
the risk factors to their minimums so that the system outputs a risk level of 1.0 and then 
adjusting one risk factor at a time to its maximum. However, because of the nonlinear nature 
of fuzzy inference system, the influence of each risk factor is not constant (as in Table 19). 
When the risk factors are interfering together, their influences slightly overlap and can 
therefore vary. This is caused by the fact that there is a limited number of possible 
consequences in the rule base and, therefore, the weighted sum of the antecedents must be 
rounded to the nearest possible consequent. 
Table 19 gives some insight about the means to mitigate a risk effectively. For example, it can 
be concluded that the development of operator’s CRM and SOP has the most positive impact 
on the risk level. On the other hand, the failure rate of the pressurisation alone has a small 
impact as it is only a single factor of the aircraft model risk. 
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7 Summary and Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis was to make a research about different kind of risk analysis 
methods used in the aviation field and find suitable means to develop new kinds of risk models 
for the field of flight planning in commercial operation of performance class B aeroplanes. 
More specifically, the case examples concerned the risk analysis of aerodrome and landing site 
determination and flight planning. In total, ten analysis methods were reviewed and of these, 
the weighted hierarchical modelling technique and fuzzy rule-based analysis method were 
chosen for further utilisation. As a result, two different weighted fuzzy hierarchy models were 
developed. In addition, the models were linked to each other so that the aerodrome and 
landing site determination model complements the flight planning model. The models 
consisted of 80 risk nodes in total, of which 49 nodes were leaves that took the input values 
into the system. The nodes were then connected to each other using 30 fuzzy inference blocks 
in total. 
The effectiveness of the weighted fuzzy hierarchy models is primarily based on the utilisation 
of expert judgement instead of pure accident data. Yet, the model is still complemented with 
the information about aircraft systems’ failure rates. The expert judgement is applied in 
multiple phases, which include the identification of the risk factors, forming their hierarchical 
structure and establishing the importance weights and membership functions of the inputs. 
Particularly challenging in the process is the establishment of justified importance weights for 
each risk factor as the evaluation is highly dependable of subjective opinions per each expert. 
In this thesis, this issue was avoided by gathering opinions from multiple experts using a 
pairwise comparison method and then calculating a geometric average of all the responses. 
Although the standard deviation of the responses was relatively high, the results seemed to be 
rational. With the weighting, the risk factors considered more important could be emphasized 
in the model so that the output is more dependent on their values. 
The high level use of expert judgement in the risk analysis was based on the principle that 
proactive assessment method should be preferred instead of relying on reactive interpretation 
of accident statistics (alone). Often, an accident is a result of one or two main causes, which 
are then aggravated by multiple further events. The key factor is to proactively identify all the 
individual risk factors, which might contribute to an accident to happen, and find their causal 
relationships. This way, the flights having higher potential to end up in an accident can be 
determined based on the assumption that they also more likely contain more adverse risk 
elements in their operation conditions. Finally, although the weighted fuzzy hierarchy model 
only determines how much risk factors are present during a flight, it also indirectly determines 
the likelihood of an accident for that flight. 
The results of the risk analysis proved to be rational and realistic. Three distinct scenarios 
were introduced in Section 4.4 to illustrate different operational conditions based on 
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geographical locations, aerodromes’ properties and environment conditions. The model 
logically gave the lowest risk level for the defined scenario 1 as it was a flight over an 
inhabited area using large category A airports. The risk level rose for the defined scenario 2 
when severe icing was present and smaller aerodromes were concerned with less runway 
length available and worse braking action. Also, the performance limitations of the arrival 
aerodrome had discernible effect on the risk level. Still, the result for the defined scenario 3 
wasn’t as high as for the scenario 2 although most challenging category C airports were 
concerned at night and in severe crosswind. The explanation for this was that these drawbacks 
were overridden by other aspects and that icing was not present and therefore the braking 
action was also better. 
The most prominent distinction between the results of example flights was caused by the 
variation of flight crew related parameters. The difference in the results was up to 50 % 
depending on whether the low risk or high risk flight crew configuration was used. This result 
can be easily justified as most aviation accidents are caused by pilot errors. Moreover, a closer 
study revealed that the quality of the pilot training and operating procedures had most 
influence in the risk analysis and their importance cannot therefore be underestimated. The 
type of the operated aeroplane had also a moderate effect on the results with up to 18 % 
relative difference. 
In the original research questions defined in Section 1.2, the influence of the risk period 
(single-engined aeroplanes) and the cruise altitude to the overall exposed risk were to be 
solved. According to Figure 25 on page 65, the effects were illustrated to be rather limited as 
they represent only two single factors of the total 49 input parameters. It is challenging to 
calculate a single percent value to describe the risk variation as it is not constant in every 
configuration due to the nature of the fuzzy logic system. Based on the data in Table 19 on 
page 66, estimates of 1.4 % for the cruise altitude and 2.1 % for the risk period are given. 
However, for single-engined aeroplanes, these parameters are not totally independent of each 
other as lowering the cruise altitude may also increase the risk period in certain circumstances. 
If assumed for example that a single-engined aeroplane is flying over an open sea, where no 
en-route alternates exist, the risk period increases with the same rate as the cruise altitude is 
decreased. 
The objective of the thesis was also to determine and validate the risk factors concerning an 
emergency landing site. In the risk model, six input parameters were used to describe the 
applicability of a landing site. These were obstacles, surface, elevation, length, width and 
slope of the runway. Moreover, it was assumed that the base risk level of a landing site is the 
maximum risk level of an aerodrome risk when no environment risks are taken into account. 
This was rationalised with the fact that, typically, a landing site is not originally meant for 
aircraft operation and no up-to-date information is available about its current condition. 
Because of the latter reason, the validation of risk factors is a challenge. If no other available 
means are available, the operator should visit the place on a regular basis and confirm the 
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appropriateness of the place to be used as an en-route alternate. However, it was earlier 
calculated that a typical single-engined aeroplane can glide up to 34 minutes from FL260 to 
1 000 ft AGL after engine failure. Because of this, there are not many places in Europe, where 
landing sites should actually be addressed. 
The risk models still need further development and validation before they could be accepted to 
the actual operator use as the risk models are still rather simplified and experimental. The 
models calculate the risk level based only on the risk factors they identify. Many more 
complicated aspects, which can have effect to the actual risk, are still excluded. For example, 
the flight crew’s familiarity with the chosen aerodromes may also have an influence to the 
pilot error risk. In addition, no further indicators were yet developed to the flight planning 
model to measure the actual effectiveness of the crew resource management and standard 
operating procedures. It is therefore challenging to determine which kinds of procedures are 
factually efficient. 
Finally, the targets established for this thesis were reached. A new tool was developed to 
quantify the selections made upon the flight planning process and to calculate their 
corresponding risk level. Some risk mitigation means were also introduced and it could be 
showed that the risk can be greatly mitigated especially by improving flight crew related 
parameters. Moreover, the type of the operated aeroplane had a distinct effect on the output 
and modern redundant aeroplanes should therefore be preferred. The method also proved to be 
efficient in the airport categorisation process and it showed that the results were consistent 
with existing EASA’s criteria. 
The following steps are suggested to be conducted in the further development process of the 
flight planning risk models: 
1. Amend the hierarchies with more branches, 
2. Develop the definitions of the membership functions, 
3. Revise the weights of the risk factors, 
4. Validate the appropriateness of the results with practical experiments, 
5. Define the safety limits for the flight operations, and 
6. Develop the graphical user interface for the risk analysis. 
This thesis showed that the weighted fuzzy hierarchy method as a technique is efficient in the 
risk analysis process and therefore it is recommended to be applied it to other cases besides the 
flight planning. As CAA Finland has recently transferred to risk-based approach to manage 
their activities and resources, it is worth to study the implementation of the weighted fuzzy 
hierarchy method. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Simulink Model of Aerodrome and Landing Site 
Determination 
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Appendix 2 Simulink Model of Flight Planning 
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Appendix 3 Weight Ratio Matrices of Aerodrome and Landing Site 
Determination 
 
 
aerodrome_risk lnd_site_risk environ_risk cond_risk dimen_risk
aerodrome_risk 1,0 0,3 0,8 cond_risk 1,0 0,8
lnd_site_risk 3,3 1,0 1,4 dimen_risk 1,2 1,0
environ_risk 1,3 0,7 1,0
obstacles gnd_surface elevation
airport_cat rwy_cond_risk obstacles 1,0 1,5 2,3
airport_cat 1,0 1,3 gnd_surface 0,7 1,0 2,0
rwy_cond_risk 0,7 1,0 elevation 0,4 0,5 1,0
properties environ_spec perf_limits length width slope
properties 1,0 0,8 1,1 length 1,0 1,9 1,5
environ_spec 1,3 1,0 1,1 width 0,5 1,0 1,1
perf_limits 0,9 0,9 1,0 slope 0,7 0,9 1,0
light_systems appr_systems circling_min weather_risk light_cond icing
light_systems 1,0 0,9 1,6 weather_risk 1,0 1,7 1,0
appr_systems 1,1 1,0 1,9 light_cond 0,6 1,0 0,8
circling_min 0,6 0,5 1,0 icing 1,0 1,3 1,0
airport_elev avg_weather obstructions rvr precipitation wind_risk
airport_elev 1,0 0,7 0,7 rvr 1,0 1,8 1,6
avg_weather 1,5 1,0 1,0 precipitation 0,6 1,0 0,7
obstructions 1,4 1,0 1,0 wind_risk 0,6 1,4 1,0
rwy_ratio braking_act wnd_spd wnd_drctn wnd_gust
rwy_ratio 1,0 1,2 wnd_spd 1,0 0,6 0,8
braking_act 0,8 1,0 wnd_drctn 1,6 1,0 1,1
wnd_gust 1,3 0,9 1,0
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Appendix 4 Weight Ratio Matrices of Flight Planning 
 
sector_risk flight_crew_risk aircraft_risk duty_hours previous_sctrs
sector_risk 1,0 0,8 0,7 duty_hours 1,0 1,0
flight_crew_risk 1,2 1,0 1,7 previous_sctrs 1,0 1,0
aircraft_risk 1,4 0,6 1,0
age_cmndr age_copilot oml_rstrctns
departure enroute_risk arrival age_cmndr 1,0 2,1 0,7
departure 1,0 2,1 0,7 age_copilot 0,5 1,0 0,8
enroute_risk 0,5 1,0 0,4 oml_rstrctns 1,5 1,2 1,0
arrival 1,5 2,4 1,0
ac_model_risk ac_age_risk mel_risk
enroute risk_period altitude ac_model_risk 1,0 1,7 0,7
alternate 1,0 1,1 1,4 ac_age_risk 0,6 1,0 0,5
risk_period 0,9 1,0 1,4 mel_risk 1,4 2,2 1,0
altitude 0,7 0,7 1,0
redund_risk prop_rel_risk sys_rel_risk
pilot_error_risk incap_risk redund_risk 1,0 1,1 1,2
pilot_error_risk 1,0 2,8 prop_rel_risk 0,9 1,0 0,8
incap_risk 0,4 1,0 sys_rel_risk 0,9 1,3 1,0
crew_exp_risk crew_tr_risk fatig_risk climb_grad reverser antiskid
crew_exp_risk 1,0 0,7 0,9 climb_grad 1,0 1,6 1,8
crew_tr_risk 1,5 1,0 1,4 reverser 0,6 1,0 0,9
fatig_risk 1,1 0,7 1,0 antiskid 0,6 1,2 1,0
cmndr_exp_risk copilot_exp_risk eng_failure prop_failure
cmndr_exp_risk 1,0 1,4 eng_failure 1,0 1,9
copilot_exp_risk 0,7 1,0 prop_failure 0,5 1,0
cmndr_total cmndr_type cmndr_recent pres_failure power_failure
cmndr_total 1,0 1,2 0,9 pres_failure 1,0 0,4
cmndr_type 0,9 1,0 1,3 power_failure 2,4 1,0
cmndr_recent 1,1 0,8 1,0
model_age freq_unexp
copilot_total copilot_type copilot_recent model_age 1,0 0,6
copilot_total 1,0 1,3 0,7 freq_unexp 1,8 1,0
copilot_type 0,8 1,0 1,1
copilot_recent 1,5 0,9 1,0 num_cat_a num_cat_b num_rie
num_cat_a 1,0 1,3 1,3
crm_perf sop_perf num_cat_b 0,7 1,0 1,3
crm_perf 1,0 1,1 num_rie 0,8 0,8 1,0
sop_perf 0,9 1,0
